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1. Introduction and Scope 
 
Eliga H. Gould begins his book
1
 with a simple question: “When did the American 
Revolution begin? Was it the commencements of hostilities on Lexington Common or 
the imperial reforms of the 1760s?”  
The author of this thesis sees the period between 1763 and 1767 as the crucial phase in 
the “Prologue to Revolution”, when significant changes in British policies took place. 
Most scholars see the Treaty of Paris as the turning point in relations between the 
British Empire and its North American colonies because of changing priorities in British 
politics and policies. 
Jack P. Greene
2
 characterizes the imperial-colonial relationship as “an uneasy 
connection” as the North American colonies used the advantage of their freedom to 
develop their own dynamic political culture and by this they acquired all the conditions 
necessary for a self-governing state. 
As M. Beloff
3
 already stated in 1949, this transatlantic relationship was mostly seen as a 
prelude to American history rather than a crucial part in British history. These relations 
between Britain and its American colonies were not only the problem of laying the 
foundations of a new state but the problem of a necessary adaptation of the imperial 
organization and constitutional framework for the British Empire, more aligned with the 
political realities of the age. In addition, this period of time is closely connected with the 
George Grenville who became First Lord of the Treasury in 1763. It was his main 
intention “to bring order and system to the management of financial and colonial 
affairs.”4  
In this short period the American colonists first formulated clearly their ideas about 
local and central authority in a representative government – a problem that has not 
arisen to that extent ever since.  
The main reasons for this change were the rapid growth of the population, a rapidly 
expanding economy, the appearance of well educated and skilled local elites – strongly 
                                                 
1
 Gould, Eliga H. et al., Empire and the nation: the American revolution in the Atlantic world, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2005, p. 1. 
2
 Greene, Jack P., An uneasy connection, in Kurtz, Stephen and Hutson, James (eds.), Essays on the 
American Revolution, Chapel Hill 1973, pp. 32-36. 
3
 Beloff, Max, The Debate on the American Revolution, Nicolas Kaye, London 1949, p. 2. 
4
 Derry, John, Government Policy and the American Crisis, in: Dickinson, Harry T., ed., Britain and the 
American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998, p. 48. 
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supported by the local population – and in correlation, the political rise of the legislative 
assemblies.  
This period under analysis ended with a tactical concession: the repeal of the Stamp Act 
to appease the Stamp Act Crisis and to clarify the authority of Parliament through the 
Declaratory Act for “presence and future”, which in turn asserted Parliament´s authority 
over the colonies.” In the words of Cogliano, it provided the “authority to make laws 
and statutes of sufficient force and vitality to bind the colonies and people of America, 
subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever.”5 The bills repealing the 
Stamp Act and the Declaratory Act passed the Parliament on March 4, 1766, a 
milestone in a coherent phase of growing political contradiction and discourse. 
The rise of Atlantic history allowed scholars to transcend traditional national 
approaches and to analyze the broader context and impact. Jack P. Greene describes the 
American Revolution “as the first step in the still incomplete process of dismantling the 
imperial structures created during the early modern era to bring newly encountered 
areas of the globe into political, economic, and cultural association with the new nation-
states of Europe.”6 
With regard to the various root causes of the revolution, scholars offer a range of 
consistent explanations: was it the reaction of the colonial elites, defending their power 
and influence in the existing colonial assemblies? Was it the change in economic 
policies, taxation or the limitation on the territorial expansion in a period of rapid 
growth of population and trade? Was it the unsettled question of constitutional authority 
Britain possessed and asserted in its colonies, the discourse about the “virtual 
representation” which finally led to the “no taxation without representation” dispute? 
Was it the resistance of the colonists against a standing army and the admiralty court 
after the Peace of Paris? Finally, was it the ideological background of the colonists, as 
B. Baylin
7
 described in his book “The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution”? In this seminal publication he sees the intellectual traditions of the 
colonial elite to create a libertarian and political ideology – which he has been calling 
the “Real Whig Ideology” – taken from the English opposition to British rule in 
                                                 
5 Cogliano, Francis D., Revolutionary America 1763-1815, Routledge, New York 2009, p. 59. 
6
 Greene, Jack P., The American Revolution, American Historical Association, Vol. 105, Washington 
2000, p.93. 
7
 Baylin, Bernard, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, President and Fellows of Harvard 
College, Harvard 1992. 
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America during the eighteenth century. This ideological position predisposed 
Americans to develop an extraordinary sensitivity toward all threats to liberty.  
As Cogliano
8
 also points out, the colonists believed that by history and the Bill of 
Rights of 1689 they enjoyed the right to self-government, to petition for redress of 
grievances, a trial by jury, freedom of speech and religious toleration, somehow limited 
to Protestants. 
In the following chapters the author describes the given social, economic, political and 
administrative situation in the American colonies before 1763 and outlines the 
numerous constraints for the British imperial strategy to regain metropolitan authority 
after the French and Indian War by ending the British policy of “salutary neglect”, when 
marginal Imperial interference allowed the colonists to ignore British laws and to 
develop their own political institutions.  
These political developments in the colonies had been backed by a remarkable 
demographic and economic expansion. The population of the thirteen British colonies 
grew from 250,000 in the year 1700 to roughly 1,600,000 in the year 1760. The reasons 
for this remarkable growth were 600,000 immigrants between 1700 and the American 
Revolution. 
  
Table 1. American population growth, 1700-1800
9
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Cogliano, Francis D., Revolutionary America 1763-1815, Routledge, New York 2009, p. 47. 
9
 Ibid, p. 32. 
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Map 1 shows the areas of expansion: in 1660 the settlements were close to the shoreline 
of New England and the Chesapeake Bay area, whereas in 1760 the expansion took place 
in the Southern colonies and the backlands between the Atlantic coast and the 
Appalachian Mountains. 
 
Map 1. Geographical expansion of population in the American colonies, 1660-1760
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cogliano explains the cause of the numerous immigration waves by citing the 
“relatively large amounts of land and a shortage of labor. Since the family was the 
essential economic unit, as well as social unit, large families were a valuable source of 
labor. Thus economic necessity combined with demographic factors – an increase in life 
expectancy by comparison with the seventeenth century as well as early marriage – to 
produce a high birth rate.”11 As a result, the American colonies became increasingly 
important to Britain, in both economic and strategic respects. 
As a result of this increase in population, “the colonial economy expanded at a rate three 
or four times faster than that of Britain during the seventy-five years before American 
independence.”12 
                                                 
10
 Murrin, John M. et al., Liberty, Equality, Power, Thomas Wadsworth, Boston 2008, p. 177. 
11
 Ibid, p. 33. 
12
 Dickinson, Harry T. (Ed.), Britain and the American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998, p. 31. 
Dark grey: settled by 1660        
Light grey: settled by 1760 
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The Peace of Paris in February 1763 concluded a series of wars among the European 
powers in North America and extended the British possessions apart from the thirteen 
Old Colonies by vast new territories acquired in the French and Indian War: from 
Canada to Florida and from the Atlantic coastline to the Mississippi river.  
These new possessions offered a commercial and strategic transatlantic benefit. 
However they also imposed huge financial burdens resulting from the recent fighting 
and ongoing military presence of fifteen battalions of about ten thousand soldiers.  
Presence of and pacification by the army was still needed: by May 1763 the Indians 
under Chief Pontiac rebelled against the illegal appropriation of Indian land and 
challenged the British imperial authority to limit political settlement. Britain now had to 
expand its governance to 60,000 French Canadians, mostly Catholics, 3,000 Spanish 
subjects in Florida and 150,000 western Indians
13
. The political decision and its 
consequences were discussed under military constraints – twenty battalions to control a 
vast territory and no intention to send more troops – and led to a restriction of American 
colonial expansion into these new territories beyond the Appalachian Mountains. 
George III approved the creation of three additional colonies - Quebec, East Florida and 
West Florida and the remaining land remained Indian territory. These new frontiers 
were laid down in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The colonists distrusted a standing 
British army as the French force had been removed from the continent. The colonists 
suspected that the British maintained the garrisons and troops in the colonies as a means 
of control rather than for defense purposes. In 1763, the Treasury reported an estimated 
minimum cost of 250,000 pounds to maintain the garrisons in North America, which led 
to an irresistible political and public demand that a parliamentary tax in the colonies 
should go toward covering these expenses. 
John Derry
14
 describes this era of conflict as Britain´s reasonable short-term need to 
reduce the huge financial burdens as the consequence of the Seven Years War and to 
gain control of the immense commercial and strategic potential. In 1763 the British 
army was scattered across a vast territory and was by far too small to perform the 
control tasks required of it. The Royal navy was also too small even to prevent the 
widespread smuggling and evasion of trade laws by the colonists. Although 
                                                 
13
 Mason, Keith, Britain and the Administration of the American Colonies, in: Dickinson, Harry T., ed., 
Britain and the American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998, p. 41. 
14
 Derry, John, Government Policy and the American Crisis, in: Dickinson, Harry T. (Ed.), The American 
Colonies, W.W. Norton, New York 1976, p. 45-48. 
9 | P a g e  
 
Middlekauff
15
 warns against trying to reduce the problems to one word, which is 
“deficit”, given that taxation became a crucial question in relations between Britain and 
the colonists.  
Trade was depressed in Britain and the British taxpayers had to foot most of the bill for 
the war. B. Donoughue
16
 describes the concurring political issues: the British country 
gentry had to bear most of the war-time expenditure and expected a reduction in 
taxation. The aristocracy and land-owning gentry endured levies that peaked at 25 
percent of their annual income. 
British debts had climbed up to 132 million pounds, of which a huge amount had been 
used to protect the British Colonies in America. This huge amount of debt caused 
annual interest of 4.4 million pounds out of an annual budget of 8 million pounds. 
Because of these extraordinary fiscal facts a reduction of the Land Tax from its peak of 
four shillings in England seemed impossible, but it became a political and economic 
objective that the American colonies should contribute significantly to their own 
defense and administration.  
Until 1763, there was no focused fiscal awareness of the Treasury and thus of multiple 
responsibilities and involvement for the colonies – King, Prime Minister, Secretary of 
State for the South [formal responsibility], Privy Council, the Board of Trade and 
Plantations, Admiralty – and a status of traditional fiscal autonomy was attained which 
existed until 1763. As long as the colonies exported cheap raw materials to Britain and 
imported finished goods from Britain, the mercantilist function of this colony was 
fulfilled.  
Salutary neglect policy allowed the colonists to ignore existing acts such as the 
Navigation Act or the Molasses Act, which created a sort of self-government in the 
colonies. Besides, few British ministers and politicians had a good overview and 
understanding of the complex nature and situation in the colonies. The ones with a 
detailed knowledge had either little influence or were often critical of the colonies and 
colonists as they did extensive trading with the enemies during the war.  
The research question of his essay will analyze the growing divergence of economic, 
constitutional and social positions from 1763 until 1767. Starting with the execution of 
the already existing Navigation Act, which secured a monopoly for English shipping,  
                                                 
15
 Middlekauff, Robert, The Glorious Cause, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, p. 57-58. 
16
Donoughue, Bernard, British Politics and the American Revolution, Macmillan, London 1964, p. 3. 
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the restriction of colonial economic development was continued by the Proclamation 
Line in 1763 and the Currency Act in 1764. It will be followed by the constitutional and 
political dispute about taxation without the consent of the colonies, their reactions and 
the final repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766.  
These interactions between Britain and the colonies were also the consequence of the 
relationship between the King and the Prime Ministers and in the Parliament of the 
differentiated but opposing standpoint of the Whigs.  
 “Although the conflict between Britain and the American colonies involved economic 
rivalries and social antagonisms the only coherent and articulate means of carrying on 
the debate lay in the fields of constitutional theory and legal argument”17.  
The outcome of this multidimensional discourse in terms of political, economic, social 
and constitutional results of 1767 will become classified either as colonial progress or 
setback, compared to the initial situation before 1763.  
With regards to the economic and social taxonomies, quantitative overviews will deliver 
the results, for the political and constitutional discourse the content and effect of 
pamphlets and Acts will be qualified and rated as colonial benefit or drawback, 
compared to the status quo of 1763. 
The author will finally review the controversial positions and will work out an 
aggregated summary of the major findings and root-causes of colony´s responses and 
resistance to British measures and positions.  
 
2. Political Institutions and their Discourse 
 
2.1. The Political System in Britain and in the American Colonies 
 
B. Donoughue
18
 describes the framework of political power in eighteenth-century 
Britain, which was divided between Parliament – Lords and Commons – and the Crown 
by the Constitution. This eighteen-century British constitution since the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 was admired “by such distinguished commentators as Voltaire, 
Montesquieu and De Lolme.”19 This mixed government had defined privileges and 
                                                 
17 Derry, John, English Politics and the American Revolution, J.M. Dent & Sons, London 1976,  
p. 27. 
18
 Donoughue, Bernard, British Politics and the American Revolution, Macmillan, London 1964,  
p. 10-15. 
19
 Dickinson, Harry T., ed., Britain and the American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998, pp. 86-101. 
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distinct functions for each institution. On the one side the King´s prerogative of 
choosing and dismissing Ministers, on the other side the right of the House of Commons 
to reject the King´s choice. Consequently, the effectiveness of the Government was 
dependant on a reasonable cooperation between these two institutions. 
Besides this pragmatic balance, the king was above law and the head of the executive, 
whereas the Lords formed the highest court of justice. The Commons “represented the 
people” and worked out proposals for legislation and had control of public spending. 
All three institutions together formed the approving body for legislation: no bill could 
become law without first being approved by all three institutions in the same session of 
British Parliament. The British structure of balanced constitution and government had 
created independent roles, but in the process of passing legislation all three were 
dependant on each other and formed a sophisticated system of checks and balances to 
ensure the political goals of a well regulated state: liberty and stability.
20
 
“Early in George III´s reign there was no real party system operating in England to give 
a readily understandable pattern or framework to political debate.”21 Donoughue 
describes three basic types of House of Commons Member: the politicians, the “Court 
and Treasury” supporters and the independents. The category “politicians” could be 
characterized by “their interest in power and their ambition for high office” and they did 
group around leaders as Grenville or Rockingham who owned the prestige but also had 
the necessary connections to make the way into Administration. 
The second category, the “Court and Treasury members”, were mostly lawyers, army 
officers or civil servants, offering their support to any Ministry of the King´s own 
choice, expecting “some sign of favor”. This faction numbered roughly one third of the 
Commons, whereas the independents were the largest section. They consisted of the 
country gentry and urban constituencies and “since they were obliged to nobody for 
their seats or their incomes, none of them could be called upon to vote in a certain way, 
or even to attend a debate.”22 
J. P. Greene characterizes the political system as“…a game between a small number of 
players; the kings, who were participants and not referees, much less spectators; the 
heads of connections which were in office; and the leaders of those who were struggling 
                                                 
20
 Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the laws of England, 4 vols, 7
th
 edition, Oxford 1771, pp. 154-
155. 
21
 Dickinson, Harry T., ed., Britain and the American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998, p. 10. 
22
 Ibid, p. 13. 
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to get in.”23 Under the given division of power between the King and Parliament and the 
heterogeneous composition of the House of Commons, two essential conditions became 
the prerequisite for a stable and consistent Administration in eighteenth-century Britain:  
The leader of the Administration - the Prime Minister - needed the confidence of the 
King but also the support of the majority in the Commons. This complexity of the 
political structure also played a role in the malfunctioning of the administration of the 
colonies. 
Therefore, little interference of the British policy in the colonies´ internal affairs until 
the beginning of the 60s had allowed the colonists to establish their own political 
institutions – the elected colonial assemblies – which were supported by the absence of 
an accepted constitutional relationship that clearly defined the rights of the colonies.  
The very first legislative body in the colonies was the House of Burgesses, founded 
already in 1619 as the elected lower house in the Colony of Virginia. The executive 
head of the colonies was the governor, who was appointed by the King, by the 
proprietors of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware or popularly elected as in Rhode 
Island and Connecticut. The governor was assisted by a council whose members were 
appointed by the governor or elected by the assembly as in Massachusetts. The 
governors had no police force and rarely had sufficient troops at their disposal except 
during wartime.  
“Although colonial governors had considerable power in theory – they could veto acts 
adopted by the colonial assemblies; they determined when and where the assemblies 
could meet and they could dissolve assemblies and call new elections – in practice they 
were hamstrung by the assemblies that controlled their budgets, including their salaries. 
The result was a persistent conflict between local and imperial authorities.”24 “By the 
mid-eighteenth century the colonial assemblies had become the principal vehicles 
through which the provincial elites could exert their authority and the colonists could 
protect their rights and privileges. These assemblies increasingly took over procedures 
and practices of the British House of Commons, such as election practices and the 
debates and legislation. Like the Westminster parliament, the colonial assemblies held 
two crucial levers of power: the right to vote on taxes and expenditure, and the right to 
initiate legislation.”25  
                                                 
23
 Greene, Jack P., Pole J. R., A Companion to the American Revolution, Blackwell, Malden 2000, p. 6. 
24
 Cogliano, Francis D., Revolutionary America 1763-1815, Routledge, New York 2009, p. 45. 
25
 Dickinson, Harry T., ed., Britain and the American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998, p. 4. 
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As Jack P. Greene asserts, the colonial political culture had acquired “virtually all the 
conditions necessary for self-governing states.”26 
Consequently, this conflicting issue of sovereignty was raised on both sides of the 
Atlantic: the crucial question was whether the Provincial Assemblies were separate and 
sovereign under the Crown, or whether they were subordinate to the British legislators 
at Westminster. The local elites also extended their power and influence into local 
government institutions and also became legitimized by a high proportion of colonists 
who possessed the voting rights. 
“It has been estimated that between fifty and eighty per cent of adult white males in the 
various American colonies were qualified to vote, a far higher proportion of the adult 
male inhabitants than was the case in Britain.”27 
The right to vote for members in the assemblies always required a property 
qualification, but varied from colony to colony. “In most places it was equivalent to the 
English forty-shilling freehold, that is, ownership of a property with a rental value of 
forty shillings.”28 
This difference between the formal and actual powers of the colonial governors clearly 
showed the limits of central authority within the American colonies up to the 60´s of the 
eighteenth century. The responsibility for the imperial administration and supervision in 
trade matters fell to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations – mostly called 
Board of Trade – reporting to the Parliamentary Committee on Plantation Affairs, which 
made recommendations to the Privy Council, and which finally exercised the 
operational authority over the colonies. In addition, the Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department was the principal minister responsible to Parliament for American 
colonial government until 1768. Besides, the colonies were of course subject to 
legislation adopted by Parliament. To follow the ongoing discussions and developments 
of colonial affairs, the colonies employed agents, either Members of Parliament or 
prominent colonists such as Benjamin Franklin and special interest groups like the West 
Indian planters. The outcome of this complex and sometimes controversial structure was 
an inefficient complex of institutions, worsened by the long distance between the 
imperial center and the colonies during the age of sail. 
                                                 
26
 Greene, Jack, P., An uneasy connection: an analysis of the preconditions of the American Revolution, 
in Kurtz, Stephen, Hutchinson, James eds, Essays on the American Revolution, University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1973, p.35. 
27
 Dinkin, Robert, Voting in Provincial America, Greenwood Press, Westport 1977, p. 86. 
28
 Middleton, Richard, Colonial America, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 2002, p. 349. 
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2.2. The Natures and Powers of Provincial Assemblies 
 
An early publication of L. Labaree already summarized the persisting disparity of views 
about the role and legislative power of the provincial assemblies: 
“The colonists felt that, as Englishmen, they had a right to share in making law and 
laying taxes through agents of their own election. They believed that the summoning of 
an assembly by a royal governor in accordance with his commission and instructions 
was nothing but the recognition of this right could not be denied them. Therefore, the 
assembly, though called into being by a royal act, was just as fundamental and essential 
a part of the provincial constitution as the King´s own representatives….But they [the 
ministers and the agents of the crown] would not concede that the only means to 
accomplish that end was a local assembly exercising powers equivalent to those of 
parliament….Therefore the British officials vigorously opposed the tendency of the 
assemblies to exercise freedom of action equal to that of parliament.”29 
Based on the imperial structure, the appointed Royal Governor and the council were 
intended to be the superior authority in the colony, whereas the elected assembly was 
relegated to a subordinate role vis à vis the Governor. It was the governor who was 
expected to initiate the law-making process and the assembly had the role of advice and 
consent, but no inherent right to legislate. In practice, the initiative in legislation was 
taken over by the assemblies whereas the governor´s role became limited to that of 
consenting to bills. 
This gravitation was significantly exercised by the assemblies in matters of local 
finance. Until the 1760´s it was accepted status of the crown´s law officers that the 
power of taxation was entirely left to the provincial assemblies, whereas Parliament 
refrained from taxing the colonies. 
But in the middle of the eighteenth century the provincial elites exerted their legitimate 
authority in the colonial assemblies. As a higher proportion of adult males could vote in 
the colonies, compared to approximately twenty percent in Britain, “the colonial 
assemblies therefore had the means and the moral authority to place effective limits on 
the power of the crown´s agents and officials in the colonies.”30  
                                                 
29
 Baree, Leonard W., Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System before 
1783, New Haven 1930, pp. 174-175. 
30
 Dickinson, Harry T. (Ed.), Britain and the American Revolution, Longman, New York 1998,  
p. 4. 
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The upcoming political culture progressively empowered the elected over the appointed 
institutions, causing a polarization and increasing resistance. 
The emergence of the colonial elites was clearly related to the growth of population and 
wealth, and by the 1760´s the provincial assemblies had become the de facto centers of 
the political structure in the colonies, whereas the positions of the governors steadily 
declined. 
Royal governors were dependant on the goodwill and financial support of the 
assemblies and their imperial authority was finally based on the consent and approval of 
the elected colonial representatives. In practice, it was the assembly which took over the 
political control and forced the governor to accept a passive and dependant role.  
This deadlock situation raises a crucial question: could Britain ever have met the 
demands of legitimized elites of the colonies?  
Tucker and Hendrickson
31
 argue that the imperial administration had never reflected 
this basic question and consequently did not work on a strategy that might have 
responded to this problem. The absence of an accepted constitutional relationship 
defining the rights and duties of the colonies and the authority of the imperial power 
might also explain why colonists considered their elected assemblies as possessing 
similar powers in all cases of internal governance. It is important to mention that the 
privileges of the colonial assemblies were merely privileges and not rights in a legal 
sense. 
Francis D. Cogliano describes the colonial perception of their “Rights of Englishmen”. 
“Before the 1760´s few colonists actually attempted to enumerate precisely what those 
rights were, but most would have agreed that they included the right to self-government, 
petition for redress of grievances, trial by jury, freedom of speech, and a measure of 
religious toleration as delineated in the Bill of Rights of 1689.”32 After 1689, the 
Imperial authorities accepted the assemblies as a necessary element for local legislation 
and taxation. Step by step, the assemblies “expanded their powers over public accounts 
and expenditures, the issue of paper money, and the salaries and fees of royal officials. 
Assemblies also eroded gubernatorial power to nominate or appoint revenue officials, 
                                                 
31
 Tucker, Robert W., Hendrickson, David C., The Fall of the First British Empire, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1982, pp. 150-152. 
32
 Cogliano, Francis D., Revolutionary America 1763-1815, Routledge, New York 2009, p. 47. 
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colonial agents, public printers, and judges, and to manage the Indian trade, military 
affairs and local courts. ”33 
After the Seven Year´s War, the imperial officialdom had two theoretical political 
options to choose from. For one, they could allow the colonial elites to become involved 
in the political center of the empire – a move which would have been step toward 
colonial representation in Parliament.  
The second option would have been to bring the emerging colonial elites under their 
control – a move which would have been tantamount to a complete transfer of 
legislative power over “internal affairs”. This would entail “internal” taxation issues and 
retaining the right to deal with external matters of general imperial concern, based on an 
Imperial constitution. 
In relation to this question of “internal” taxation by Parliament, the original contract 
connoted that the first settlers of the colonies “undertook and affected the settlement of 
America, with an assurance that they could not be divested of their property and liberty 
without their consent given in their respective assemblies.”34 
But British governments refused to make any formal concessions of power to the 
colonies. 
On the contrary, the assertion of imperial supremacy had been reaffirmed on a number 
of occasions, starting with the Royal Proclamation in 1763. Tucker and Hendrickson 
characterize it as “a system of government by instruction, which in its rigidity was 
incapable of adjusting to a rapidly changing colonial reality, or rather because from the 
outset the system was too permissive in practice, however strict it may have appeared in 
theory.”35 
The design of the imperial constitution was drafted in critical respects as non-federal in 
theory and in fact even it had some federal features such as a “national Parliament”. The 
dilemma was the missing or unclear distinction between imperial and provincial 
purposes, between “internal” and “external” objects. Since the assemblies took over the 
commanding role in this imperial, non-federal design – regional governments are 
dependent on the general government through the powers of disallowance and veto – 
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the evident American federal structure challenged the British “centralized legislative 
omnipotence”.36 
It was the essential basis of imperial control that Parliament hold the right to determine 
the limits of its own power. A matter of fact which was not compatible with the colonial 
assemblies with their privileges and an opposition by an emerging federal scheme. 
McLaughlin
37
 defined federalism as a system “in which powers of government are 
separated and distinguished and in which these powers are distributed among 
governments, each government having its quota of authority and each its distinct sphere 
of activity.” 
The constitutional conflict, which arose after 1763, was caused by the Grenville reforms 
which initiated a partial abandonment of federal practices and a significant cut-back of 
the assemblies´ privileges. 
 “Salutary neglect” had laid the foundation for these self-governing institutions which 
finally formed the prerequisite for an increasing autonomy in terms of economic, 
political and social independence. In the mid-sixties the colonies had reached a level of 
political maturity and economic power whilst the Grenville ministry still treated the 
colonies as weak dependencies and thought, as Tucker and Hendrickson characterized, 
“that the clock could be turned back to an earlier time, and that the colonists could 
somehow be made to accept a reform of the imperial relationship which set distinct 
limits to the ever-growing claims of provincial assemblies.”38 
The author will finish this chapter by quoting Edmund Burke who brilliantly 
characterized the British dilemma: “An Englishman must be subordinate to England, but 
he must be governed according to the opinion of a free land. Without subordination, it 
would not be one Empire. Without freedom it would not be the British Empire.”39 
In brief, the dispute was the conflicting claims of subordination and freedom. 
Grenville´s coercive policy had been the opposite to a theoretical solution, a “federalist 
empire”, based on equal and independent legislature and bound by the common 
allegiance to the Crown. 
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2.3. Introduction to the Constitutional Discourse 
 
Jack P. Greene raises the basic question in his book “Peripheries and Center” namely 
“what these colonies were?”40 
None of the colonies had ever denied that they were dependent upon the English Crown, 
but they also insisted on their rights as Englishmen, which they had claimed on the basis 
of royal charters. 
Greene quotes the assertion of the Maryland Assembly already in 1638 “that all the 
inhabitants of this Province…shall have and enjoy all such rights liberties immunities 
priviledges [sic!] and free customs within this Province as any naturall [sic!] born 
subject of England hath [sic!]….in the Realm of England.”41  
As long as Parliament played a very limited role in colonial affairs until 1763, the 
legitimacy of Parliament´s authority was not questioned before.  
Greene argues that there was a constitutional crisis after the Seven Years´ War “because 
the metropolitan government never explicitly admitted in theory what had developed in 
practice, however, the authority of the assemblies in the peripheries vis-à-vis that of the 
crown and the Parliament at the center remained in an uncertain state as late as the 
1760s.”42  
To limit the considerable power in the executive institutions granted by the eighteenth-
century constitution, the American colonists based their “political theory” on the ideas 
of John Locke, that is the governmental contract between subjects and Crown, between 
the ruler and the ruled. This reciprocal relationship was a quid pro quo relationship: the 
subject paid allegiance to the Crown and the King was obliged to protect the subjects as 
person, property and rights. 
John P. Reid
43
 argues in the introduction to his book “Constitutional History of the 
American Revolution” that the definition of the word “constitution” remains unclear. 
When analyzing the eighteenth-century, three distinctions should be kept in mind: 
constitutional, legal and political. During the 1760s, law and the legal system were 
embraced in varying degrees by the word “constitutional” defining the rights of citizens 
and the limits of government power, the public law of today. The third source for this  
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chapter will be Tucker´s and Hendrickson´s book – two political scientists from Johns 
Hopkins University –“The Fall of the First British Empire”.44 
“The traditional, or Whig, view emphasizes the essentially defensive character of this 
response [to the larger purposes of imperial rule] : the Americans asked for no more, 
and no less, than to be placed again in the position they enjoyed before the Grenville 
administration embarked on its campaign to extinguish the traditional rights of the 
British American colonies.”45  
It was William Pitt (the Elder) who articulated a constitutional theory and announced 
his opposition to the Stamp Act, as the colonists were not represented in the Parliament. 
“Pitt´s theory was based on four premises: the definition of property, the logic of 
federalism in the British Empire, the terms of the commercial contract; and the 
contention that under British constitution taxation and legislation were distinct and 
separate government powers.”46 
His definition of property was connected with the doctrine that taxation needs the 
consent of the taxed. His second position about the nature of federalism was related to 
the supreme authority of Parliament, but this supremacy was not absolute; it excluded 
the “internal taxation” from the scope of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The discourse about “internal taxation” on behalf of revenue and “external taxation” on 
behalf of the regulation of trade started with the Sugar Act and escalated during the 
Stamp Act crisis, as the American colonists then asked for a return to the status quo of 
the pre-Grenville era, summed up by “salutary neglect”. Pitt emphasized the 
commercial contract, too: “Let this distinction, then, remain forever ascertained, 
Taxation is theirs; commercial regulation is ours.”47 
Pitt´s last premise was the distinction between authority to tax and the authority to 
legislate. In his famous parliamentary speech on January 14, 1766, he expressed fierce 
opposition to the Stamp Act: 
“This House represents those Commons, the proprietors of the lands; and those 
proprietors virtually represented the rest of the inhabitants. When, therefore, in this 
House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax, 
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what do we do? We, your Majesty´s Commons of Great Britain, give and grant to your 
Majesty, what? Our own property? No. We give and grant to your majesty, the property 
of your Majesty´s commons in America. It is an absurdity in terms.”48 
Pitt´s formula was the constitutional taxation-representation connection, whereas the 
second opponent, Baron Camden, stressed the principle of taxation-only-by-consent-of-
the-taxed.  
In contrast to the fundamental American position, British opponents to the Stamp Act 
insisted that Parliament was absolutely sovereign over the colonies except in the field of 
taxation, a position which was rejected by the colonial Whigs. They denied Parliament´s 
authority both to tax and to legislate because they were not represented. 
As we will see in Chapter 2.6., this radical Whig position followed an earlier moderate 
position, denying just internal taxation. 
 
2.4. Virtual Representation vs. Colonies´ Consent in Tax Matters 
 
In Britain there was a general agreement at that time that the Stamp Act was right in 
principle as Grenville had the support of constitutional and legal experts and was 
convinced of the constitutional validity of the Stamp Act. Grenville defended the 
familiar concept of virtual representation as the Parliament of Great Britain represented 
the whole kingdom and its status did not depend on the degree of direct participation 
and the colonies were subject to the laws made by the British Parliament. Tucker and 
Hendrickson
49
 describe the affirmed British position: the Parliament´s right to tax the  
colonies depended upon the representative character of this legislative body and 
Grenville did not deny the principle of representation: “The objection of the colonies is 
from the general right of mankind not to be taxed but by their representatives. This goes 
to all laws in general. The Parliament of Great Britain virtually represents the whole 
Kingdom….Not a twentieth part of the people are actually represented.”50 
Indeed, many of the urban areas in England were totally underrepresented, but there was 
some actual representation in England, however inadequate but in place; the American 
colonies were not represented at all. 
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Thomas Whately, who drafted the Stamp Act bill, defended this constitutional position 
in a pamphlet in 1765 titled “The Regulation lately made concerning the Colonies and  
the taxes Imposed upon Them [sic!]”.51  
“The Colonies are in exactly the same Situation: All British Subjects are really in the 
same; none are actually, all are virtually represented in Parliament; for every member of 
Parliament sits in the House, not as Representative of his own Constituents, but as one 
of that august Assembly by which all the Commons of Great Britain are 
represented……The parliament of Great Britain not only may but must tax the 
Colonies, when the public Occasions require a Revenue there: the present 
Circumstances of the nation require one now; and a Stamp Act, of which we have had 
so long Experience in this, and which is not unknown in that Country, seems a eligible 
Mode of Taxation…..it must appear proper to charge certain Stamp Duties in the 
Plantations to be applied towards defraying the necessary Expenses of defending, 
protecting, and securing the British Colonies and Plantations in America.” 
His defense of the virtual representation rested on the proposition that the interests of all 
British “were given due consideration by Parliament and not sacrificed to partial 
advantage.”52 The doctrine of Thomas Whateley was the assumption that the role of 
Parliament was to balance the interests of the various parts of the whole empire and, 
because of Parliament´s responsibility “for the greater good of the whole”, there would 
be no difference between virtual and physical representation in terms of resulting 
legislation.  
This position was also supported by the Lord Chief Justice Mansfield who linked 
representation with effective authority. He asserted that representation first arose by the 
favor of the crown and qualified the notion “that every subject must be represented by a 
deputy, if he does not vote in Parliament himself, is merely ideal.”53 
At no time was physical colonial representation in Parliament seriously considered. 
Apart from the questions of distance and time, the colonists would form a small 
minority in Parliament for the time being. 
During the debate on the Repeal of the Stamp Act, one speaker rejected colonial 
participation, because “they grow more numerous than we are, and then how 
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inconvenient and dangerous would it be to have representatives of 7 millions there meet 
the representatives of 7 millions here.”54 
It was Virginia which started to prepare a resolution, followed by most other colonies 
and they offer the most widely approved statements of the American position in 1765. 
In the Rhode Island Resolves, September, 1765
55
 the colonies’ standpoint was clearly 
stated:  
“4. That, therefore, the General Assembly, of this Colony, have, in their representative 
capacity, the Only exclusive Right to lay Taxes and Imposts upon the Inhabitants of this 
Colony: And that every Attempt to vest such Power in any person or Persons whatever, 
other than the General Assembly aforesaid, is unconstitutional, and hath a manifest 
Tendency to destroy the Liberties of the People of its Colony.” 
A second fact attacked by the colonies was the executive authority for the Stamp Act, 
as evidenced by the Pennsylvania Resolves, dated September 21, 1765
56
: 
“That the vesting and Authority in the Courts of Admiralty to decide in Suits relating to 
the Stamp Duty……foreign to their proper Jurisdiction….contrary to Magna Charta…” 
This dispute about the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act was the beginning of a more 
determined American opposition movement. The cabinet had acted on the belief that the 
resolves were the work of a small, intellectual minority in the colonies. 
 
2.5. The Discourse about “Internal” and “External” Taxation 
 
“From the Restoration to the Great War for the Empire, the authority of Parliament to 
legislate for the colonies, an authority that evidently implied the supremacy of 
Parliament over the colonies went unquestioned.”57 
Up until 1763, trade restrictions and prohibition were dictated by the strategic 
requirements of the Seven Year´s War to cut support for the French enemy, but under 
the Grenville administration the regulation of trade became driven by revenue 
requirements. 
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The American constitutional doctrine in the 1760s “admitted the right of Parliament to 
levy customs duties (external taxes), but denied the right of Parliament to levy excise 
taxes (internal taxes) on them.”58 
The distinction between internal and external taxation was an English one, because 
there was no constitutional distinction between the two. According to the American 
position, expressed by Franklin in his testimony to the Commons, the distinction “was 
not between unconstitutional internal taxation and constitutional external taxation. It 
was between unconstitutional taxation without consent and the constitutional regulation 
of commerce, in which customs duties were applied for purposes of regulation, not for 
purposes of raising revenue.”59 
The American colonist´s position failed to clarify their position how they regarded 
duties on trade for the single purpose of revenue, as the Sugar Act foresaw. 
Randolph G. Adams
60
 draws the constitutional line between the Sugar Act and the 
Stamp Act: “The Sugar Act was constitutional, according to this understanding of the 
colonial position, the Stamp Act was not. In the aftermath of the 1767 Townshend 
Revenue Act, which was clearly fiscal in intent, the colonies then conceded the right of 
Parliament to regulate the Trade of the Empire, and hence exercise a legislative 
authority over the unrepresented colonies, but denied the right of Parliament to levy 
taxes of any kind whatever, internal or external.” 
The Sugar Act was the original precedent for an ambiguous discourse and the colonial 
position, and the Sugar Act was not explicitly seen as unconstitutional by the colonists. 
In his pamphlet, Daniel Dulany (see Chapter 2.6.) admitted a right of Parliament to 
regulate trade without consent, even accepted the constitutionality of revenue taxes on 
external commerce, which was clearly given by the Sugar Act. 
Another – and possibly the major – “purpose for calling taxes internal was to draw 
attention on the division of government power we now refer to as federalism. To say 
that authority was internal was to say it was local and properly within the jurisdiction of 
the separate colonial legislature.”61 
 
                                                 
58
 Ibid, p. 134. 
59
 Reid, John, Ph., Constitutional History of the American Revolution, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison 1987, p. 37. 
60
 Adams, Randolph G., Political Ideas of the American Revolution, 3
rd
 ed., New York 1958, p. 91. 
61
 Reid, John, Ph., Constitutional History of the American Revolution, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison 1987, p. 38. 
24 | P a g e  
 
3. Overview of Major Events and Personalities 
The first part, the Chronology, is taken from Steven Sarson’s62 compilation table in “A 
Companion to the American Revolution” because of the most appropriate structure. 
Harry T. Dickinson on the other hand, provides the more compressed but concise 
overview.
63
 
 
Table 2. Chronology 1763. 
Political and legal events  Military Campaigns, civil 
order and Western 
settlement  
Social, cultural, economic, 
scientific and  
religious developments  
April 8. Resignation of the Earl 
of Bute. Beginning of Grenville 
ministry.  
February 10. Peace of Paris. 
Britain gains Quebec, Florida, 
and all North America east of the 
Mississippi. Military presence of 
15 regiments under Gage, based 
in New York, estimated 225,000 
pounds. Bute suggests colonists 
should pay.  
April 19. Customs board 
reveals 1,800 pounds annual 
revenue. Parliament passes 
“An Act for the further 
Improvement of His 
Majesties Revenue of 
Customs” for inspections of 
ships below 50 tons. 
 May 7-November 28. Pontiac´s 
uprising. 
April-September. Earl of 
Shelburne serves as 
President of the Board of 
Trade. 
 October 7. Royal Proclamation 
Line forbids settlement west of 
line marked by Alleghenies. 
September. Earl of 
Hillsborough is appointed 
President of the Board of 
Trade. 
 
 
Table 3. Chronology 1764. 
Political and legal events  Military Campaigns, civil 
order and Western 
settlement  
Social, cultural, economic, 
scientific and  
religious developments  
April 5. American Duties Act 
creates new Vice Admiralty 
Court in Halifax 
July 10. Board of Trade issues 
“Plan of ´64” for cooperation 
with Amerindians. 
April 5. Sugar Act replaces 
Molasses Act, extends 
number of goods enumerated 
under Navigation Acts and 
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makes duties and fines 
payable in sterling. 
June 13. To combat British 
policy the Massachusetts House 
establishes the first Committee of 
Correspondence. 
 April 19. Currency Act 
extends prohibition of paper 
money to colonies south of 
New York; all paper money 
in circulation withdrawn. 
  August. Boston merchants 
agree on non-importation to 
counter Sugar Act. 
 
 
Table 4. Chronology 1765. 
Political and legal events  Military Campaigns, civil 
order and Western 
settlement  
Social, cultural, economic, 
scientific and  
religious developments  
March 22. Parliament passes Stamp 
Act; opposition is led by William 
Pitt the Elder and Earl Camden. 
March 24. Mutiny/Quartering 
Acts require colonists to 
provide billeting for British 
troops. 
October 28. New York 
agreement on non-
importation. Colonists 
continue to conduct business 
without stamp. 
April. Publications against the 
Stamp Act by J. Otis, J. Adams. 
August 14. Bostonians burn 
the houses of Stamp Collector 
Oliver and Hutchinson. Sons 
of Liberty organized. Protests 
render the Stamp Act 
unenforceable. 
 
June 8. Massachusetts General 
Court urges colonies to join in a 
Stamp Act Congress. 
  
July 10. Resignation of Grenville. 
Beginning of Rockingham ministry.  
  
October 7-25. Stamp Act Congress 
in New York, attended by eight 
colonies. Ratifies J. Dickinson´s 
“Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances”. 
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Table 5. Chronology 1766. 
Political and legal events  Military Campaigns, civil 
order and Western 
settlement  
Social, cultural, economic, 
scientific and  
religious developments  
March 18. Repeal of Stamp Act. 
Declaratory Act asserts 
Parliament´s right to legislate for 
colonies. 
January. Second Quartering Act 
billets troops in taverns and 
unoccupied dwellings. Violent 
opposition in New York. 
January 17. Petition of 
British merchants affected by 
boycotts reaches Parliament. 
July. Resignation of 
Rockingham. Beginning of Pitt 
ministry. 
May. Settlers occupy 
Monongahela Valley of 
Pennsylvania without 
Amerindian consent or purchase. 
September. Charles 
Townshend begins devising 
external taxes for America. 
September. Charles Townshend 
becomes de facto Prime Minister 
because mental health of Pitt 
deteriorates. Lord North becomes 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
 November 1. American 
Trade Act reduces duty on 
Molasses and creates two 
free ports in the Caribbean. 
September. Ch. Townshend 
begins consideration of new 
external taxes on the American 
colonies. 
  
December 18. Robert Nugent 
appointed President of Board of 
Trade. 
  
 
Table 6. Chronology 1767. 
Political and legal events  Military Campaigns, civil 
order and Western 
settlement  
Social, cultural, economic, 
scientific and  
religious developments  
September 4. Death of Charles 
Townshend; the Duke of Grafton 
becomes the real head of 
ministry, though Chatham 
remains the nominal head. 
 June 29. Townshend Duties 
Act passed and the Board of 
Customs Commissioners 
established in Boston. 
 December 31. Non-importation 
agreements spread through the 
colonies. 
December 30. 
Massachusetts General Court 
condemns the Townshend 
Duties.  
 
The author will complete this chapter with an overview of four personalities who 
contributed most to the controversy and discourse between Britain and the colonies 
between 1763 and 1767: George Grenville and his “mastermind” Thomas Whately as 
27 | P a g e  
 
the driving strategic forces on British side and James Otis and Daniel Dulany as 
intellectual colonial opponents and pamphlet writers.   
 
3.1. George Grenville 
 
“George Grenville was a man of ability, with long experience in the House of Commons 
and administrative experience as secretary of the navy and secretary of state…..But he 
had long been over-shadowed in politics by his brother Lord Temple and even more so 
by his brother-in-law, William Pitt the Elder.”64 
Grenville entered the House of Commons in 1741, supported by his uncle Viscount 
Cobham, and became a lord of the admiralty in 1744, where he gained the reputation 
“as a thorough-going administrator with a head for figures and a scrupulous desire to 
limit government expenditure.”65 
When he was appointed First Lord of Treasury he wanted to change a system of 
inefficiency in fiscal and colonial affairs. His further intentions were to create the 
position of the prime minister and to clarify the supremacy of the British Parliament.  
At this point it is worth mentioning that we have to make a necessary differentiation. J. 
P. Marshall puts it as follows: “George Grenville, first minister from 1763 to 1765, is 
usually linked with these measures, not least because of his personal commitment to the 
Stamp Act. But any temptation to think in terms of a “Grenville programme” for the 
colonies should be avoided. The decision to base an army in North America and to 
make the colonists pay for its upkeep was taken by the King and Grenville´s 
predecessor, the Earl of Bute. And Grenville´s forthright views on Parliament´s role as 
an Imperial legislature, complete with taxing powers, were widely shared.” 66 
This first intention had impacts on the prerogative of the Crown and the second should 
weaken the power of the colonial assemblies.  
To begin with his more favorable fundamental qualities: he was incorruptible, resolute, 
devoted to duties, and endowed with a strong sense of public responsibility.
67
 These 
skills and abilities brought him into the Treasury, but his less favorable qualities could 
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not keep him there. Dora Clark mentions his arrogant personality and suspicious 
disposition which created very formal and mistrustful relations among the ministers and 
his relationship to George III deteriorated progressively. George III found him very 
pedantic and tiresome: “His own forte lay in financial matters, and he had the King´s 
support in his desire for public economy, although George III later stated that his 
minister had the mind of a clerk in a counting house.”68  
His dismissal in July, 1765 was the result of the unwillingness of the ministers of the 
inner cabinet to work with him and the King´s increasing disfavor and loss of royal 
confidence. 
His very ambitious program of imperial taxation and reorganization of the colonial 
administration was motivated by more fundamental reasons than a temporary concern 
about tax revenues and defence issues. 
It was Grenville´s character to study the subject matter carefully before taking a 
decision and it was once said about him that “he lost America because he read the 
American despatches, which his predecessors had never done.”69 
In his article, T. Barrow gives a comprehensive overview of the influential role of 
reports from 1757 on, issued by the Customs Commissioner and concluded later by the 
Board of Trade.  
These reports
70
 give a very strong indication of the “salutary neglect” policy of the 
British colonial administration, when two Governors forwarded evidence of “pernicious 
trade” between the colonists and the French islands in the Caribbean: “By this indirect 
Way his Majesty´s Enemies are supplied.” After receiving this information, the Board 
of Trade ordered an investigation into illegal trade and smuggling in the colonies from 
the Commissioners. In 1759, the report – a compilation of 26 reports from the colonies 
– was delivered and by this time the Treasury became interested and increasingly 
involved in the question how to enforce the commercial Acts in the colonies and started 
to put pressure on the Board of Trade and its Commissioners. 
The Commissioner´s report, dated May, 10, 1759
71
 can be grouped under three quoted 
categories: 
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1. The illicit Importation of Rum and Molasses from the French Islands into the 
British Northern Colonies. 
2. The importation goods from different parts of Europe (particularly Holland and 
Hamburg) into North America, and of the carrying Enumerated goods from 
thence to the said places, and others in Europe, contrary to law, whereby all such 
imports and exports are restrained to Great Britain only. 
3. The pernicious practice of supplying the French Colonies and plantations with 
provisions from his Majesty´s Colonies, or from Ireland. 
 
In 1765, Thomas Whately, the secretary at the Treasury and assistant to G. Grenville, 
estimated
72
 that the value of goods smuggled into the American colonies was around 
seven hundred thousand pounds and expected they would climb even higher. As the 
mercantile system was based on direct trade between motherland and colonies, this 
“salutary neglect” of the Acts of Trade and Navigation Acts was a major threat to the 
colonial tax revenue. Put into relation to the total value of imported commodities in 
Table 1. (as total 3,920,000 pounds) this estimated volume of wholesale smuggling 
represented a share of approximately 18%. 
These documents and reports showed G. Grenville the poor effectiveness of the colonial 
commercial restriction. He concluded in his letter to the Privy Council, “that the 
revenue in America was very small and inconsiderable, having in no degree increased 
with the Commerce of those Countries, and is not yet sufficient to defray a fourth part 
of the Expense necessary for collecting it.”73 
T. Barrow raises the question whether the Grenville ministry, “following the advice of 
that particular colonial official, consciously used the problem of imperial defense and 
finance, which were in themselves legitimate issues, to screen their efforts to establish 
effective controls over colonial commerce. But it is true that the end of the war 
presented the English government with both an opportunity and an excuse for 
undertaking a general reorganization of the imperial machinery.” 74 
Grenville recognized the ongoing undermining of the dependence of the colonists in 
relation to the mother country by the “salutary neglect” policy, which was the outcome 
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of a non-sufficient colonial control system. Ostensibly, the “Grenville program” did 
tackle the problem of financing the imperial defense by colonial taxes, but the author 
argues that the underlying strategy of G. Grenville was to restore effective 
subordination in commercial, political and constitutional terms. 
  
3.2. Thomas Whately 
 
Closely related to G. Grenville was his private secretary and advisor, Thomas Whately, 
a sort of “political mastermind” since May 1762, when Grenville was appointed 
secretary of state.  
In October 1762 he followed G. Grenville who was transferred to the Admiralty and 
again in April 1763, when Grenville became head of the Treasury. In this position, 
Whately became key person among the British junior-ministers. Among historians 
writing about the early stages of the American Revolution, Whately is seen as a 
pamphleteer who “set out to provide a broad general defense of British colonial policy 
as a coherent system, outlining the leading considerations…”75  
Grenville had the highest confidence in Whately and delegated to him extensive 
responsibilities for preparing and executing major decisions and consequently he 
became highly involved in colonial policy. Because of this involvement he actively 
maintained a network of prominent colonists to gather information, and B. Baylin sees 
him as “the best informed person in England on the intricacies of the laws and 
regulations governing the colonies.”76 
As H. Dickinson
77
 points out, his pamphlet The Regulations Lately Made Concerning 
the Colonies, and the Taxes Imposed upon them, Considered
78
 is the most 
methodological and detailed defense of G. Grenville´s colonial policy before the Stamp 
Act crisis. This paper is an important source of information about ministerial thinking in 
which he defended the unity of the British Empire and had two main views: revenue and 
even more so: legislative and commercial control. At the beginning of the pamphlet he 
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blamed the former administration: “There have been Ministers ignorant of the 
Importance of the Colonies; others, have impotently neglected their Concerns; and 
others again have been diverted by meaner Pursuits from attending to them: But happily 
for this Country, the Real and Substantial, and those are the Commercial Interests of 
Great Britain, are now preferred to every other Consideration: And the Trade from 
whence its greatest Wealth is derived, and upon which its Maritime Power is principally 
founded, depends on a wise and proper use of the Colonies.”79 This paragraph was a 
clear message in order to end the salutary neglect of the former administrations and to 
put a strategic focus on the colonies. In addition, he clearly stated that this empire 
needed a single authority which was, in this case, the Westminster Parliament, based on 
his concept of the unitary nature of the empire as “one nation”. Consequently, he is 
convinced of Parliament´s constitutional right to impose duties on the colonies and 
denies any legitimate distinction between internal and external taxes.  
This distinction became a very fundamental – even ideological issue – and controversial 
in terms of representation, sovereignty and lawful taxation.  
“In the arguments occasioned by the Stamp Act, a distinction had been taken between 
internal and external taxes; by the former were meant taxes on things out of the 
immediate power of commerce; by the latter, taxes on such as were within it. These 
(being paid at the ports) were more generally called duties. The former had been denied 
upon the principle (among others) that such a power of taxing subjected the whole of 
every American´s property to the power of Parliament; by which means he could not be 
said to have any that was absolutely his own.”80 
Cristie summarizes the aim of this pamphlet as follows: “As appears from the balance of 
the discussion in Whately´s pamphlet and from his own expressed opinion, regulation of 
trade was in his view a far more important object of the legislation of 1764 than 
revenue.”81  
This discourse about virtual and physical representation, the different views on 
sovereignty and the in-depth analysis of taxation will be discussed in Chapter 8 of this 
thesis. 
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3.3. James Otis 
 
Otis gained prominence during the controversy over the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act in 
1764 and 1765. His most famous pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted 
and Proved was published in 1764 after Otis – a Massachusetts lawyer, educated at 
Harvard – took on a leading role as constitutional advocate for the colonists. He was a 
successful politician as opposition leader in Massachusetts from 1761 until 1770 and he 
can be characterized as a practical political thinker, more than as a theorist. Basically, 
Otis was educated as a patriotic Briton and always wished to remain British. At the 
same time he criticized the fact that the British constitution did not secure Anglo-
American rights and concluded the need for a reform to keep Anglo-America free and 
British.  
His major pamphlet, The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved, was 
published during the controversy over the Sugar Act and Stamp Act, leaning heavily on 
natural rights, natural law and the ideas of John Locke. Consequently he denied the right 
of Parliament to tax British colonists because “the supreme power cannot take from any 
man any part of his property without his consent in person or by representation.”82  
Richard A. Samuelson
83
 entitles his essay, “James Otis: Resistance and Loyalty” to 
express his differentiated legal position: on the one hand he regarded taxation of 
unrepresented colonists as a violation of the law of nature, denying the right to do so 
and regarded such acts as void, on the other hand he accepted the Parliament´s power to 
tax the colonies. This differentiation between Parliament´s power and the right ended in 
his legal conclusion: “we must obey; they [the members of Parliament] only can repeal 
their own acts.”84 This position was his preferred option: “when a government exceeded 
its legitimate scope or acted unjustly, a subject had only three options: quit the country, 
revolt and try to institute a government that will better uphold rights, or submit to the 
bad law and work to change it through regular channels.”85 
By this, Otis expressed his belief that the constitution was superior to Parliament and 
that Parliament was superior to the law and sought to reform the imperial constitution 
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“to end the dispute by reconciling “three separate constitutions”, the “British 
constitution for the central state”, the “separate provincial constitutions” and the “as yet 
undefined, even unacknowledged, imperial constitution.”86 
This dispute escalated in August 1765 during the Stamp Act riots, which were regarded 
as a constitutional means of protest by the colonists: “if Parliament was under the law, 
but acted contrary to it, then popular uproar was a legitimate, if somewhat extreme way 
to remind Parliament of its place, and to correct this error.”87 According to the colonist´s 
view, resistance to illegitimate acts did not imply rejection of legitimate authority. 
From 1765 onwards, Otis tried to find an imperial structure to formalize the relations 
between the mother country and her American colonies and to secure equality 
throughout the empire. Hence, his idea was an imperial Parliament to integrate 
periphery and center in order to also guarantee the rights of the subordinate colonies – 
with representation of the American colonies. “Parliament could rightfully legislate for 
Americans on all issues – including taxation.”88 
In so doing, Otis tried to find a constitutional solution by guaranteeing not only the 
supremacy of Parliament but also the equality of American Britons with those of Great 
Britain: a fair American representation in an imperial Parliament which would grant to 
the colonies’ laws the same legitimacy as laws relating to Great Britain, which would 
have become another subordinate state equally under an imperial Parliament.
89
 
Otis failed to overcome the practical impossibility to create a functioning system of 
representation because of 3,000 miles distance between the mother country and the 
colonies. 
In addition, Otis called for economic reforms: “The first steps towards it [reform] must 
be forming an entire new system of commercial laws, the demolition of all monopolies 
great and small, and throwing open all the ports of the world to the colonists, under 
proper restrictions.”90  
James Otis tried to prevent the imperial Stamp Act crisis as early as 1765 and the later 
revolution by working hard on a reasonable solution to the imperial problem and to 
overcome the ideological tensions latent in the Whig tradition. 
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3.4. Daniel Dulany 
 
John E. Alden gives the following assessment of Daniel Dulany, a lawyer and politician 
in Maryland, educated at Eton and Cambridge. He writes: „Of all the controversial 
writings provoked in the American colonies by the passage of the Stamp Act, Daniel 
Dulany´s “Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies” 
was undoubtedly the most significant and influential….the pamphlet went through two 
editions in Maryland, where it was first published, and was reprinted both in New York 
and London. Setting forth the thesis that the American colonists, since they could not 
have virtual representation in Parliament, could therefore not be taxed by that body 
without violating a fundamental concept of English law, Dulany developed an argument 
which was to be more than popular in the minds of colonial radicals.” 91 
Dulany has often been cited as a source who distinguished between internal and external 
taxes, but his pamphlet focused on more general constitutional arguments against the 
Parliamentary taxation.   
In this pamphlet, Dulany´s position was that internal taxation was not part of the 
authority of the Parliament, it was the jurisdiction of representative bodies. Dulany 
argued that taxation and legislation were separate matters and had always had been 
treated as such in the past. The only representative bodies in America were the colonial 
assemblies, so that an American could “give his Consent in no other Manner than in 
Assembly.” 
He argued: “It appears to me that there is a clear and necessary Distinction between an 
Act imposing a Tax for the single Purpose of Revenue, and those Acts which have been 
made for the Regulation of Trade, and have produced some Revenue in Consequence of 
their Effect and Operation as Regulation of Trade.”92 
 “A Right to impose an internal Tax on the Colonies without their consent, for the single 
Purpose of Revenue, is denied; a Right to regulate their Trade without their Consent is 
admitted.”93 
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Dulany´s position on taxation remains somehow unclear, as he rejected internal taxes as 
unconstitutional, but admitted duties on trade in general without the contrasting 
differentiation “for the purpose of regulation” and “the purpose of revenue”. 
As he never used “external taxation”, Dulany agreed to the imposition of duties – the 
external taxation – also for the single purpose of revenue and not only for trade 
regulation, which he rejected for internal taxes. 
Dulany also quoted the principle of The Common Law and clearly opposed Whatley´s 
position on virtual representation and admitted that taxation was not a function of 
sovereignty but rather the prerogative of a physical representative body: “that no Part of 
their Property shall be drawn from British Subjects without their Consent, given by 
those whom they depute and to represent them; …..The Colonies claim the Privileges of 
British Subjects – It has been proved to be inconsistent with those Privileges, to Tax 
them without their own Consent and it hath been demonstrated, that a Tax imposed by 
Parliament, is a Tax without their Consent.”  
In this first stage of Dulany´s – and colonial – resistance, “they still admitted the 
authority of Parliament to regulate trade and to legislate in other ways for the whole 
empire; they still denied that Parliament had the right to tax them. These views they 
continued to affirm until the 1770´s when they advanced to the more radical position of 
denying the authority of Parliament to legislate as well as to tax.”94 
 
4. The Colonies before 1763 
4.1. Salutary Neglect vs. Imperial Control 
 
 
The subject matter of this chapter is twofold: it analyzes the structure of the colonies´ 
administration and political institutions and evaluates the conflicting issues between 
local elites and the British intentions. The second section is a review of the execution of 
trade laws during and after the “salutary neglect” period.  
It had led to colonial distrust but also created a united national identity in the colonies as 
Edmund Burke asserted in 1757: “Nothing of an enlarged and legislative spirit appears 
in the planning of our colonies.”95  
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The dispute and the interactions started when London’s view of the colonies changed 
radically after the French and Indian War (1754 – 1763), when George Grenville 
formed his ministry in April 1763 and put an end to the Salutary Neglect policy. 
Britain´s imperial authority was very weak and Royal governors could only do little 
without the support of the colonial assemblies. Grenville realized the need to bring the 
colonies under closer supervision and to strengthen the imperial authority by reducing 
their autonomies and to impose internal taxes on the colonies in order to finance the 
ongoing costs of imperial defense. There were no doubts that the British parliament 
possessed the constitutional authority to pass such a bill. “His own forte lay in financial 
matters, and he had the King´s support in his desire for an austerity policy, although 
George III later stated that his minister had the mind of a clerk in a counting house.”96  
The administrative structure on which Britain relied to govern the colonies was never 
really adequate for the vast territory in the New World. In fact, there was no centralized 
authority at Westminster with effective control over Britain´s relations with the 
American colonies and too many overlapping interests. “The only relatively steady hand 
in this structure was provided by the Board of Trade, which funneled information 
received from the colonies to the Secretary and relayed his instructions to governors and 
other officials in America.”97 The Board of Trade existed since 1696 at Westminster to 
supervise the commercial relations with the American colonies. It also advised on laws 
passed in the colonies and provided some small customs services there.  This board was 
headed by a president and seven active commissioners. The members of the Board of 
Trade did not have sufficient authority to steer the government´s colonial strategy, while 
ministers such as the head of Treasury had little or no experience with the situation in 
the colonies, and communication between the royal governors and government 
ministers across the Atlantic was slow. Until the Earl of Halifax became President of the 
Board in 1748, it had minor influence and authority. When he resigned in 1761, “the 
Board lost influence and the colonies lost an intelligent administrator.”98  
In this period, the Board tried to establish a much closer supervision and to tackle the 
many outstanding problems such as the issue of colonial paper money, to review the 
colonial legislation carefully and to secure metropolitan approval, but colonial 
assemblies heavily opposed these Board´s activities to defend their established 
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constitutions and local authority. When the Currency Bill was issued in 1749, a clause 
was amended which declared any colonial legislative enactments being in contrary to 
this Bill as null and void. 
The opposition rejected this clause and ultimately forced the administration to postpone 
this amendment. Indeed, the amount of circulating paper money in the colonies
99
 
increased by 355 percent from 1754 to 1764.  
It was of course the role of Parliament to define the economic relations between 
England and the colonies, but H. Dickinson
100
 sees the root cause of “salutary neglect” 
in a “laissez-faire” attitude of the Westminster Parliament, which lacked effective 
imperial control over the growing number of colonies.  
It was the Secretary of State for the Southern department who directed the governors 
and other officials in the colonies and who could order the use of military or naval 
power in the colonies. It was the Secretary of State who reported to the Cabinet, but as 
he was also responsible for Britain´s continental relations, such as those with France or 
Spain, the colonial matters were mostly of minor priority.  
A further body, the “Committee for the Plantations” of the Privy Council, advised the 
King to approve or veto colonial legislation, accept appeals, petitions and complaints 
from the colonies.  
But there were two further institutions, the Treasury and the Admiralty, which dealt 
with the colonies, too. Whereas the Treasury did manage all revenue collection and the 
national debt, the Admiralty´s duty was to control all operations related to the 
Navigation Acts and to combat the smuggling of the colonists. Given the length of the 
colonies´ coastline the Admiralty could not effectively fulfill this enormous task.  
England´s and later Britain´s American colonies were acquired under the authorization 
of the Crown over a long period of time – from Virginia in 1607 to Florida in 1763. 
Immigrants came to the colonies with grants of colonial charters, rights of 
proprietorships, and trading privileges, and with the permission to establish local legal 
and governmental institutions. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the British 
Parliament released in typical mercantilist fashion some trade acts, such as the 
Navigation Acts of 1651 and the Molasses Act of 1733.  
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The Navigation Acts were passed to establish England´s commercial monopoly over 
trade with the colonies and to generate customs revenue out of a self-contained 
economic system that spanned the Atlantic and which served the interests of the mother 
country. This Act was the first substantive effort to define the economic relationship 
between England and the colonies and to engage the competitive European powers. It 
stipulated that Americans could ship their goods in an enumerated category only to 
British ports and only on British vessels. However, proprietors or charter colonies 
ignored or even flouted the acts because of privileges granted. Cogliano
101
 shows the 
dimension of smuggling: under the terms of the Molasses Act of 1733, Americans 
should have paid approximately 200,000 pounds in duties on imported sugar and 
molasses, as 113 rum distilleries existed in British North America that used molasses as 
their main raw material. Due to inefficiency and corruption the actual total of the raised 
customs duties was 700 pounds. 
The Navigation Acts cost the colonists an estimated 1.8 percent of their income from 
exports and anywhere from 0.25 up to 1 percent in the case of imports. Thus this was an 
additional fiscal burden with low economic effect.
102
  
Tucker
103
 addresses the economic impact when he writes: “The consensus now is that 
the net burden on the colonies did not exceed 1 to 2 percent of total income in any given 
year.” 
Consequently, one major issue after the defeat of the French in Canada in 1759/1760 
was to end “salutary neglect” and to execute longstanding restrictions on their economic 
autonomy imposed by the British legislated commercial system. But Dickinson
104
 points 
out that there was a growing and robust colonial economy which was already 40 percent 
of the size of the British economy around the middle of the eighteenth Century. This 
booming economy also strongly supported the rise of local elites. 
They were well-educated and their striving for political influence was a major factor in 
weakening the authority of the royal administration in the colonies. 
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4.2. Trade and Taxation 
 
Theories of imperialism state that colonies had to produce raw materials for export to 
the mother country, which, in turn would deliver finished goods to its colonies. Within 
the British Empire, trade was regulated by the Navigation Acts, which forced the 
colonists by law to trade certain enumerated staple products using British ships within 
the Empire. The aims of the Acts were twofold: first to exclude the Dutch from the 
colonial trade and second to raise the customs revenue and to reap the material benefits 
of the colonies. 
Keith Mason
105
 quantifies the volume of this British overseas trade between 1700 and 
1750: the value to Britain and West Indian commerce showed an increase of 120%, 
from 1,855 million pounds per annum at the beginning of the eighteenth century to 
4,100 million pounds per annum at mid-century. The North American colonies became 
the fastest growing part of the British Empire before 1750. It was during this period that 
merchants trading with mainland America became organized, lobbying the Board of 
Trade, ministers and Parliament.  
Generally speaking, the English merchants tended to support the demands of their 
American correspondents and – as Jack P. Greene argues – “possessing firsthand 
information about American trade that the government needed, the merchants were 
instrumental in shaping the government´s decisions about America.”106 
Economic historians have raised the question about the advantages or disadvantages of 
the colonies to Britain. Did the colonies generate a loss instead of a profit?  
The main advantages were the significant growth of England´s export to the colonies    
 – from a 10 percent share in 1700 to 37 percent in 1772 – and the imports of raw 
material at a favorable price provided inexpensive consumer goods for the British public 
– something which had led to rising per capita income in the motherland.107  
Walton and Shepherd
108
 offer very interesting snapshots of the post-war balance of 
payments between the colonies and Britain which shows the annual deficit of about 
40,000 pounds which had to be covered by the British taxpayers. 
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Table 7. Balance of payments for the 13 colonies, average 1768-1772, in 1,000 pounds 
 
  Debit Credit 
Commodities Exports  2,800 
 Imports 3,920  
Invisible earnings Ship sales  140 
 Shipping earnings  600 
 Merchant commissions  220 
Trade balance  160  
Payment, persons Indentured servants 80  
 Slaves 200  
British tax & expenditures Taxes and duties 40  
 Salaries British Administration  40 
 Military expenditure  230 
 Naval expenditure  170 
Capital flow/Deficit   40 
 
This table shows on the one side a positive trade balance in favor of the British, the cost 
for tax collection equaled the tax revenue and the cost for British defense and 
administration turned the British trade gains into negative colonial returns. It is 
important to mention that the commercial benefits of the Navigation Acts in favor of the 
British commerce are not included and will be discussed later. 
To understand the impact of imposed taxes and duties during the years 1763-1767, the 
author will break down the value of imported and exported commodities of the colonies 
to provide the needed data for the later analysis of the severity of Grenville´s economic 
program.  
The table below shows a subset of the estimated export volume of the North American 
colonies in terms of value and destination. 
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 Table 8. Estimates of colonial exports for the period 1768-1772
109
 
 
Destination Value in pounds 
Great Britain 1,528,000 
Ireland 87,000 
Southern Europe 406,000 
West Indies 759,000 
Africa 21,000 
Total 2,801,000 
 
To analyze the patterns of trade, the composition of the exported goods offers additional 
insight. 
 
Table 9. The five most valuable commodities during the years 1768 -1772
110
  
 
Commodity  Value in pounds  
Tobacco  766,000  
Bread and flour  410,000 
Rice  312,000  
Fish  154,000  
Indigo  113,000  
 
Viewed in relation to the total exports, these five goods comprised more than 60%. 
Besides the commodity production, Walton and Shepherd quantify the “invisible 
earnings” of trade; the provisioning of shipping and distribution services generated 
significant revenues of 600,000 pounds in the period between 1768 -1772. 
In the course of the eighteenth century, colonial trade became an increasing economic 
factor in the British economy as the comparison shows. 
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Table 10. Comparison of British importations in 1700 and 1773 per region
111
 
 
Imports from  1700 in %  1773 in %  
Northern Europe  34,2  22,4  
Southern Europe  26,6  14,4  
Other British Isles  7,4  10,7  
America  18,9  37,4  
East India  12,9  15,1  
 
Perkins provides a more detailed analysis, based on the colonies´ three regions: the 
northern region of New England (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island), the Middle Colonies (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware) and 
the Southern Colonies (Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia). 
This differentiation helps to break down imports and exports and to analyze the impact 
of duties and taxes, based on this regional mix of commodities. 
 
Table 11. Balance of Trade per Region
112
, 1768-1772, mean average in pounds. 
 
Region Exports to 
Great Britain 
Imports from 
Great Britain 
Trade Balance 
Northern Colonies/New England 77,000 670,000 - 593,200 
Middle Colonies 66,600 822,200 - 755,600 
Southern Colonies 1,213,600 1,336,300 - 122,700 
Total 1,357,200 2,828,500 - 1,471,500 
 
Compared to Table 8. – which is based on Walton´s and Shepherd´s figures – a 
difference of 170,000 pounds arises which can be explained by immaterial “invisible 
earnings” of the Northern Colonies.  
From this regional point of view, the Middle Colonies and Northern Colonies were most 
valuable to England – generating a positive trade balance of more than 1,300,000 
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pounds for the mother country. The northern colonies had no products which were 
unique to the western hemisphere and direct trade to Great Britain consisted largely of 
whale oil, potash and ship masts. The royal navy valued the northern colonies as a 
secure source of masts. They were important for military reasons and from an economic 
view point, they were a source of modest revenues.  
In contrast to timber exports, the whaling industry of the northern colonies showed a 
rapid expansion: in 1770 some 250 vessels had been in search of whales. Before the rise 
of petroleum, whale oil was needed for lighting. Exported whale oil generated a value of 
40,400 pounds, followed by potash, representing an export value of 22,400.  
The major destination for exports from the New England region were the West Indies 
with an export value of 278,000 pounds – mostly fish, horses and cattle – but there were 
also significant imports of molasses, rum and sugar valued at roughly 250,000 pounds, 
since alcohol consumption per capita was very high. With regards to these huge 
imports, customs duty on sugar and molasses played a significant role in regulating 
these competitive markets and curbing smuggling.  
The Middle Colonies were least important in terms of exports to Great Britain – iron 
and potash generated most of the export value – but their imports from Great Britain 
exceeded 800,000 pounds and created a negative trade balance of more than 750,000 
pounds versus Great Britain.   
Being the largest importer of British goods and at the same time the major exporting 
region of the American colonies, the Southern Colonies show the most “mercantilist 
profile”. The economic expansion of the Southern Colonies went hand in hand with the 
rising demand for tobacco in England and on the continent. Following the Navigation 
Acts, nearly all colonial tobacco shipments, 99.6%, went to Great Britain, where 
merchants re-exported about 90 percent of the tobacco to continental buyers. 
Furthermore, 52 percent of rice was exported to Britain, of which 79 percent was re-
exported to Northern European markets.
 113
 
Roger Ransom
114
 has calculated the impact of the Navigation Acts on the Southern 
Colonies under the assumption of direct export to continental ports and estimated that 
the revenues of the Southern Colonies would have increased substantially. The impact 
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on tobacco (326,000 pounds) and rice (120,000 pounds) exports might have been in 
total 446,000 pounds higher than the realized revenue under the constraints of the 
Navigations Acts. For all enumerated staples – mostly tobacco, rice and indigo – this 
“theoretical loss” of the Southern Colonies accounted for 90% of the total colonial 
shortfall, associated with the regulations of the Navigation Acts, of 565,000 pounds for 
all American colonies.  
The purpose of the enumeration was to monopolize the trade in colonial staples for 
Great Britain´s commerce and to realize a high trade margin when re-exporting these 
crops mostly to the continent.  
Consequently, the Southern Colonies contributed twofold to the mercantilist strategies: 
first, as the largest market for imported British goods within the American colonies and 
second, as the major provider of staples within the trade regulations of the Navigation 
Acts. The British mother country exercised its monopoly rights in purchasing staples 
below the continental market price, generating additional revenue for Britain´s economy 
when applying the market price for the re-exported quantities.  
As a result, the Southern Colonies as a whole were near a trade equilibrium and “The 
extension of credit to southern planters was a device employed by British merchants, 
operating in a highly competitive market, to attract business. British merchants earned 
commissions and profits first on the sale of a planter´s produce in the home market and 
then on the return shipment of finished goods ordered by the planter. Indeed, some 
scholars believe that the main source of profits for British merchants serving the 
Chesapeake area came not from tobacco transactions per se but rather from high 
markups on textiles, hardware, and luxuries sent back to the colonies.”115 
On the other hand, the level of domestic taxation in the colonies was very low and 
approached 20 percent of the tax rates prevailing in England.  
“Until 1764, the British had inadvertently encouraged this attitude, for Parliament had 
not only asked for little colonial revenue for over one hundred years, it had also 
regularly sent substantial taxes from the pockets of Englishmen overseas to finance a 
series of military campaigns on the North American continent. With their defense costs 
largely subsidized by the mother country, and without a sitting monarch, an idle 
                                                 
115
 Tucker, Robert W., Hendrickson, David C., The Fall of the First British Empire, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1982, pp. 32-33. 
45 | P a g e  
 
aristocracy, or a large court establishment to support, the colonies incurred modest 
governmental expenses at the provincial level.”116  
The colonists gained substantial reimbursement from Parliament for recruited soldiers 
and their supplies throughout the military campaigns: in the period from 1757 to 1767 
Parliament reimbursed 800,000 pounds to the thirteen colonies to cover their expenses 
during the French and Indian War.  
Consequently, the major items in the annual budget of a colony had been the salaries of 
the governor, the judges and the coverage of the legislative expenses. Perkins indicates 
the range of this annual budget: in Massachusetts the average yearly expenditure from 
1765 to 1774 was 27,000 pounds, New Hampshire spent only 2,000 pounds in 1772.
117
 
By the late colonial area, the domestic taxes represented no more than 1.5 percent of the 
estimated per capita income, whereas the English tax rate ranged from 5 to 7.5 percent 
of per capita incomes. Thus it is not surprising that the per capita incomes of colonial 
households were higher than those in Britain.  
Each colony had implemented different methods of taxing its inhabitants, mostly based 
on assessed values of land, livestock, import taxes on slaves, liquor, imports and exports 
and mercantile profits. Besides, aid to the poor had become a large financial item: 
Boston allocated up to 60 percent of its local taxes to charity. 
These domestic taxes, following the definition and explanations of Chapter 2.1., were 
“internal” taxes, based on differing methods, mostly based on personal property, 
imports and exports or a poll tax for males, mostly over sixteen. 
To give an overview of the different taxation methods
118
, the types of domestic taxes are 
grouped for the New England Colonies, the Middle and the Southern Colonies. 
Table 12. Types of Domestic Taxes, 1763-1775. 
 
Region Domestic Taxes 
New England land, unimproved  and land, assessed value 
other property, assessed 
merchant profit 
poll, linked to wealth 
excise, liquor (New Hampshire) 
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Middle Colonies land, assessed value (Pennsylvania only), land per acre 
import, finished goods, other property, assessed 
import, slaves (New York) 
excise, liquor (New York) 
 
Southern Colonies land, per acre 
excise, liquor 
import, finished goods, slaves 
export tobacco 
poll tax, flat 
poll tax on free blacks (South Carolina, Georgia) 
 
As we can see in this table, taxes on land, either per acre or ad valorem, had been 
applied in all colonies, imposed by the Colonial Assemblies. The Stamp Tax – in a later 
chapter in more detail –provided two major reasons for rejection: it was closely linked 
to land transactions, such as contracts or grants and deeds for land and was perceived as 
an additional burden, and second, it was an “internal” tax, applied on private property 
by British Parliament and not by the elected, and thus representative, Colonial 
Assemblies. 
Poll taxes had been mostly imposed in the Southern Colonies on slaveholders who were 
also liable for their slaves, whereas the poll tax in Georgia and South Carolina had been 
imposed exclusively on free blacks as a means of racial discrimination. Tobacco 
became a significant source of tax revenue in the Southern Colonies, as for example in 
Maryland and Virginia, whereas in urban areas of New England and the Middle 
Colonies imports of finished goods and the merchants´ profit had been targeted for 
taxation. 
Whereas land tax in England jumped from 10 to 20 percent during the war – the British 
tax was almost certainly the highest in the Western world – the colonial contribution, in 
terms of “external” taxes, was nil119 except for some quitrent in Virginia and Maryland. 
In Massachusetts, the tax rate for the income of merchants from trade and money 
lending was 5 percent in 1773. 
The “internal” taxes were very low in all the colonies and the net tax burden “was rarely 
more than 4 or 5 percent of family income, and in rural counties the figures were much 
lower.”120  
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5. The changes in economic and fiscal relations 
5.1. The Proclamation Line 
 
The Royal Proclamation was issued on October 7, 1763 to structure and integrate the 
newly acquired land after the French and Indian War into the British Empire.  
This Proclamation firstly regulated the colonial expansion by drawing a temporary 
western boundary line – roughly speaking along the Appalachian Mountains – to 
separate the British colonies from the Indian Reservation which can also be seen as a 
state-building attempt of the British Crown but also based on a given promise
121
 in 1758 
to motivate the French-allied Delawares to change sides. The responsibility to maintain 
law and order was left to the British army; the Board of Trade issued an Ordinance, 
dividing the West into two regions, where trading was put under control of two civilian 
Indian superintendents, but not provided with a civil government. The cost seemed too 
much for the British budget for the time being. 
Simmons quotes a comment on the Proclamation line of s Connecticut man: “Great 
Britain possesses all the advantages and not an American entitled to an inch of land.”122 
The main concern of this Proclamation was to avoid conflicts between expanding 
colonies and the Native Americans and to protect their interests. It also addressed the 
purchase of land by the colonists and can be regarded as a first legal recognition by the 
British Crown of Aboriginal rights. However, the British, for their part, believed that all 
native land ultimately belonged to the Crown. 
The considerations of this geographical limitation of western settlement were the peace 
and security of the frontier in order to maintain “cordial relations with the Indians and 
protecting their hunting grounds from settlement.”123  
There was still fear at Whitehall that Indian uprising would allow the French to regain 
influence and hold on Indian and Quebec support and would resume their old position as 
a threat to the British colonies. Indian grievances came to a head in Chief Pontiac´s 
Rebellion (1763-1765) when Pontiac led a loose confederation of Indian tribes, attacking 
British forts and settlements along the western frontier of the colonies.  
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This assault was a reminder of the complexity and sensitivity of the Indian problem and 
taken as further evidence of the need to establish imperial control over the frontier and 
the interior. “In the eyes of the Indians, the French (and Spanish) had no right to cede the 
lands of the great interior to the British since these lands had never been theirs to 
cede…Their apprehensions were sharpened when the British occupied the forts in the 
interior abandoned by the French, and, in several instances, strengthened these forts while 
building settlements around them.”124 Furthermore, the idea of land ownership was 
completely different to the cultural perspective of the Indians, where the use of land had 
been seen as for survival purposes only. 
Pontiac´s Rebellion reinforced the British policy makers in their belief that responsibility 
for the West could no longer be left to the colonists because there was the strong 
perception in Britain that the conflict had occurred because of unscrupulous trading 
activities and illegal appropriation of Indian land.  
As 2,000 Americans died during this Indian uprising, royal authorities became convinced 
of the need to keep regular troops in the colonies.  
Therefore the Royal Proclamation also declared that in future, “no private person would 
be allowed to purchase lands from Indians on either side of the line…..Colonial officials 
were forbidden to authorize White men to purchase or otherwise acquire Indian lands.”125 
There was also a clause in the Royal Proclamation about soldier settlement “to testify our 
Royal Sense and Approbation of the Conduct and bravery of the Officers and Soldiers of 
our Armies, and to reward the same.”126 The Rank of a Field Officer got granted 5,000, a 
Captain 3,000, a Staff Officer 2,000, a Non-Commission Officer 200 and finally every 
Private Man 50 acres of land at the expiration of ten years and after this period based on 
the common quit-rent of the province.  
Even the Act made a clear distinction between the Indians to the west and to the east of 
the Appalachian Mountains; it was only applied to the first group whereas the status of 
the Indian population east of the Proclamation line was based on agreement and treaties 
between the various governments and the Indians. 
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“In effect, the king was taking the Indians under his paternal protection for their own 
good.”127 Many colonists were angered by this act because it set a limit to the western 
frontier. After all, many Americans believed that the interior of the vast continent should 
be explored and settled, too. 
B. Knollenberg
128
 had uncovered other motives for limiting the expansion into western 
territories: he argues that a “hidden agenda” of the Indian boundary line was the British 
intention to discourage settlement to the west in order to keep the colonial market for 
British exports. Imperial officials feared that expanded colonies beyond the mountains 
could soon develop economic self-sufficiency and – in addition – lead to the loss of 
political control. 
In addition, the British perceived the colonial response to the call for additional colonial 
troops during Pontiac´s Rebellion as totally insufficient. Although some colonies did 
respond, the inadequacies of the colonial requisition system became obvious and the 
British conclusion was to garrison the frontiers by a standing army. The consequence of 
this decision had led the Grenville administration to impose molasses duties and stamp 
taxes to cover the cost of this protective military force, which had been estimated 
between 250,000 and 400,000 pound. 
There was a possible second “hidden agenda” of the decision to keep a contingent of 
about 10,000 soldiers in America “apparently for their defense, but also to keep them in 
proper subjection to the Mother Country.”129 This critical view on the “pure defense 
purpose” was also shared by William Knox in 1763 in his memorandum when he wrote: 
“one great purpose of stationing a large Body of Troops in America was to secure the 
Dependence of the Colonies on Great Britain.”130 
On the contrary, this proclamation was not intended to be an irrevocable obstacle to 
further westward expansion. 
“Once the imperial government acquired Indian property by fair purchase, the frontier 
could be extended westward.”131 As there was no central imperial administration to 
execute this Proclamation and the Trading Regulations, all regulations were persistently 
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undermined by illegal trade and ongoing settlements of the colonists and widely 
disregarded. It took until 1768, when British government agreed to move the 
Proclamation line westward “to accommodate Anglo-American speculators and their 
lobbyists. For a large number of land companies emerged in the 1760s as they had in the 
1740s, and their organizers were careful to recruit leading American and British 
politicians as members.”132  
In addition to the existing British colonies the opening paragraphs of this proclamation 
divides the acquired territory into four new colonial provinces: Quebec, East Florida, 
West Florida and the Island of Grenada as shown on Map 2.
133
 
Map 2. British area in North America and the Proclamation Line in 1763. 
 
 
 
This consolidation of the northern part of Old French Canada within the Proclamation 
of 1763 was based on an elected Assembly for the Province of Quebec under English 
laws and furthermore, Roman Catholic religion was guaranteed.  
The process to implementation the Assembly was clearly defined in the Proclamation: 
“…that so soon as the state and circumstances of the said Colonies will admit thereof, 
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they shall, with the Advice and Consent of the Members of our [Privy] Council, 
summon and call General Assemblies within the said Governments respectively, in such 
a Manner and Form as is used and directed in those Colonies and Provinces in America 
which are under our immediate Government.”134 
Donoughue
135
 argues that in 1763 the British had hoped that rapid immigration would 
anglicize Quebec, but the French continued to be in a vast majority. 
Tucker and Hendrickson have given a concise characterization of the Royal 
Proclamation: “A policy dominated by fear of renewed French intrigues on the frontier 
and in Canada gradually changed into one that recognized the importance of the French 
Canadians and the Indians as allies to be used against the Americans.”136  
 
5.2. The Currency Act 
 
One significant difficulty in the economic relationship was the unregulated issue of 
provincial paper money in large amounts to finance the colonial support in times of war, 
and this in turn caused a volatile relation to the British pound.  
The terms of currency issues differed in all thirteen colonies, different in the backing – 
in other words security – of the issued bills, the retirement and the length of the issue. 
As in Great Britain, the legal tender in the American colonies was denominated in 
pounds, shillings and pence, but the actual value varied from colony to colony and the 
exchange relation of a Massachusetts pound to the British pound was different 
compared with the Pennsylvania pound. 
As the output of the colonial economy began to grow significantly, a convenient 
medium of exchange such as paper money was needed to balance trade deficits, and 
already in 1690 the Province of Massachusetts issued their “bills of credit”. 
To generate a continuous demand for the paper bills, most of the colonies made the 
legal tender valid for taxes, public fees and for repayment of government loans, and the 
acceptance of the bill at full nominal value was the major factor in keeping them in a 
corridor of exchange rate to the British pound. 
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A problem arose when some colonies also allowed the use of paper money currency as 
legal tender for private transactions. At the same time the amount of paper money in 
circulation continued to increase. 
Problems arose when settling old debts, as for example when the colonial paper money 
had suffered depreciation over the year or even years. Creditors consequently demanded 
specie or a fixed exchange rate between colonial paper money and the pound to avoid a 
loss in the transaction. 
The British merchants took this issue of the increasing exchange risk to the Board of 
Trade and ministers and asked for a complete ban on all paper currency, public as well 
as private. 
Parliament´s reaction were two acts – the first Currency Act in 1751 –  restricting new 
emissions and prohibiting the bills as legal tender in all private transactions in the New 
England colonies, where depreciation had been heaviest. The second act was the 
Currency Act of 1764, when the crown and Parliament began to show more interest in 
having greater administrative control over the mainland colonies. 
The Currency Act of 1764 thus prohibited the issue of any further paper currencies “to 
be legal Tender in Payment of any bargains, Contracts, Dues or Demands whatsoever” 
after September 1, 1764.
137
 
At the end of Seven Years´ War, the problem of rising colonial exchange rates had 
heavily affected the interests of the British creditors and was worsened by the economic 
depression in Britain. 
It was the currency of Virginia which steadily depreciated in relation to the pound and 
caused ongoing losses of British merchants. “The most visible manifestation was the 
rising price of local Virginian currency in relation to pound sterling.  
The consequences of the growing indebtedness of the Chesapeake tobacco planters 
strongly affected the exchange rates, which moved above par (125) in 1756 and hovered 
around 140 until early 1762, when they shot up to 160.”138 This rise in the exchange rate 
represented a devaluation of the Virginian paper bills of nearly 30 percent within six 
years. Because of the long periods of debt settlement, the trade margins of the tobacco 
merchants became affected accordingly by this depreciation.  
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The Parliament responded with the Currency Act, which outlawed the issue of further 
colonial currency outside of New England. 
“The Currency Act of 1764 applied only to the colonies outside of New England. The 
law expanded the previous ban on legal-tender provisions [the first Currency Act of 
1751] to include not only private debts but inexplicably public obligations as well. 
Whereas the four northernmost provinces had adjusted readily to the earlier act, the 
remaining colonies were in a more combative mood by 1764, and they resisted.”139 
At the beginning of the decade, no colonist questioned the right of Parliament to 
interfere and regulate currency matters for the colonies since this was not an act of 
colonial taxation. 
It was the intention of the British merchants to lower sterling exchange rates to keep 
their expected profits, because within a few years the volume of the circulating paper 
money grew and the British creditors asked the Board of Trade either to eliminate or to 
assert effective control over the currency systems, especially in Virginia. 
The Currency Act of 1764 had little impact in the short term because attempts by the 
Crown to limit the issue of paper money was not new at all and did not affect existing 
emissions. On the contrary, it had much impact due to the provision which forbade the 
use of paper money to pay taxes. It was the outspoken intention of G. Grenville to raise 
the tax revenue significantly and this in turn would have multiplied the demand for 
species. This amendment was an economic threat especially for the poor who had to pay 
the Stamp Tax for their needed loan contracts in pound sterling they hardly possessed. 
This specific hardship among colonists was soon recognized by Parliament and this 
amendment was repealed after 1765, following a petition of British merchants.  
For the time being, the Currency Act did not represent a challenge to the colonial status 
quo and did not evoke protests based on constitutional objections. However, the 
Currency Act created some tension between the colonies and the mother country as this 
act was considered as a major grievance by the colonists.  
As the postwar depression in the colonies lengthened, the colonial economic elites felt a 
need for a relief program for trade and credit issues in order to adapt the British 
economic legislation to the realities of changing commercial relations by implementing 
a greater degree of economic sovereignty. 
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5.3. The Sugar Act 
 
The Sugar Act, sometimes called American Revenue Act, was the first tax laid upon the 
American colonists “to which they objected on constitutional grounds.”140 
After settling the military and Western policies, the government´s major task was to re-
allocate the financial burden of the colonies’ cost for defense and administration. 
The British country gentry expected a reduction in taxation once the Seven Year´s War 
was over, but faced with a national debt of 133 million pounds in 1763, Grenville was 
unwilling to reduce Land Tax.  
His first act to raise the colonial revenue was the Sugar Act (Revenue Act) of 1764, an 
amendment to the Molasses Act from 1733, when British West Indian planters became 
alarmed by the increasing trade of the New England colonists with the French sugar 
Islands and the imports of French molasses. From the early 1700s onwards the 
commercial relations between the American colonies and the foreign islands of the West 
Indies had been well established. To protect themselves, the British planters of the West 
Indies urged Parliament to regulate the trade with the competing French islands in order 
to keep French molasses out of North America.  
Tucker and Hendrickson
141
 point to an additional background: “The interest of the 
British in maintaining a favorable balance of trade between the continental colonies and 
the French islands became plainly subordinate to the strategic objective of depriving the 
French islands and French military forces of their sources of supply.” 
The Molasses Act of 1733 heavily taxed foreign produce when imported into the 
American colonies: rum and spirits at 9 pence per gallon, molasses and syrup at 6 pence 
per gallon and sugar at 5 d per hundred pounds.  
“It was less a tax than a prohibition, an attempt to give the sugar planters of the West 
Indies a monopoly on the North American trade at the expense of molasses that could 
be purchased more cheaply in French islands.”142 
Even this Molasses Act generated some revenue which did not even cover the cost of 
the collection. This prohibitive duty led to smuggling and illicit trade, which could not 
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be prevented because of the long coastline of the colonies and the lack of navy 
surveillance, so the law remained unenforced from the very beginning. 
Pitman argues “that by 1748 the prosperity and standard of living of New England and 
the Middle Colonies were intimately connected with the existence of illicit trade with 
foreign markets.”143  
Grenville´s secretary at the Treasury, Thomas Whately, estimated the value of smuggled 
goods into the American colonies at about seven hundred thousand pounds, Grenville 
himself estimated the illegal imports from northern European ports at over five hundred 
thousand pounds.  
“Instead of paying a bribe of about a penny per gallon, merchants got French molasses 
certified as British. By 1760, more than 90 percent of all molasses imported into New 
England came from the French islands.”144  
Because this duty was rarely collected due to poor enforcement, Parliament decided that 
it would more likely be paid if they cut the tax in half and increased enforcement.  
The decision to station a squadron of twenty one ships in Halifax to patrol and to put a 
stop to illicit traffic and appoint twenty-five additional customs comptrollers to 
supervise the work of the customs authorities was aimed at ensuring correct and 
effective controls on the sugar and molasses trade. 
When George Grenville tabled the Sugar Act in Parliament, he simply stated: “The great 
object is to reconcile the regulation of commerce with an increase of revenue.”145 
Consequently, the wording of the text showed that the sugar and molasses duty was 
intended as a tax and in so doing, he went beyond the regulation of trade. 
The preamble to the Act
146
 makes reference to “defending, protecting and securing” the 
American colonies. This Act was received with hostility, and some portent was given of 
the constitutional discourse to come when the lawyer John Otis on behalf of the 
Massachusetts Bay House of Representatives declared to the Governor that the Sugar 
Act deprived “the colonies of some of their most essential rights as British subjects and 
particularly the right of assessing their own taxes.”147 
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Basically, the Sugar Act was an adaptation of an existing trade regulation aimed at 
raising additional revenue, but it also launched Grenville´s combat against smugglers 
and the widespread “salutary neglect” and “was initially perceived by American Whigs 
to have been the same constitutionality as the Sugar Act of 1733, the statute that the act 
of 1764 replaced.”148 
The crucial difference between the two acts laid in the fact that the Molasses Act of 
1733 imposed duties on foreign molasses in order to protect the North American market 
for the British West Indies planters whereas the Sugar Act of 1764 had been imposed on 
all molasses imported by the American colonies. This clearly shows that the purpose 
was to generate revenue. 
The Sugar Act tried to balance the economic development of the American colonists as 
well as that of the West Indian planters. 
The lowered duty on molasses was intended to stimulate the economy of the British 
West Indies islands, while the import ban for rum was supposed to help the American 
distilling industry. This significant reduction of the tax was intended to create larger 
mutual trade volume, supported by tightened enforcement and control.  
It was expected that this tax would raise 25,000
149
 pounds per year for “defending, 
protecting, and securing the same”. J. Derry writes about expected and anticipated 
yearly revenue from the Sugar Act of 45,000 pounds
150
, in other words significantly 
more than Ritcheson´s numbers. 
To analyze the impact of the Sugar Act compared to the previous “salutary neglect” 
period, we have to look at the regional distribution of foreign molasses imports in 
pounds per American colonial region.
151
 
McCusker
152
 based his calculations for 1768-1772 on an average price of 10.67d per 
gallon of molasses: if we take the 3d per gallon as the tax amount and put it in relation 
to this average price, 28% is the imposed percentage of tax. 
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Taking the import value of E. Perkins per region and applying Murrin´s information that 
90% of imported molasses came from French islands, the impact of the Sugar Act per 
colonial Region is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 13. Imports of molasses per Region, 1768-1772, mean average in pounds. 
 
 New England Middle Colonies Southern Colonies 
Import Molasses 141,300 42,000 15,500 
o/w 90% 127,170 37,800 13,950 
New Tax Burden 35,600 10,600 3,900 
Minus Bribe -11,900 -3,500 -1,300 
Net Burden 23,700 7,100 2,600 
 
When we apply this 28% tax rate on imported foreign molasses, then the result is 
theoretical revenue of about 50,000 pounds. This correlates with the revenue 
expectations of 60,000 pounds by the Grenville administration and the calculations of 
the expected tax revenue by J. Derry. 
Following J. Murrin, the average bribe before the Sugar Act amounted to one pence, so 
the Net Burden shows the additional cost impact for the American colonies. The Sugar 
Act clearly affected the New England Region and its numerous rum distilleries and the 
Middle Colonies to a certain degree, but it had little impact on the Southern Colonies. A 
fact which should not be disregarded was an economic recession following the 
adaptation to a peacetime economy both in the colonies and in Britain. 
The strategy of the Sugar Act was twofold: it lowered the duty on molasses to 3 pence 
per gallon, but new duties were laid on indigo, coffee and wines, previously free of tax. 
The different approach compared to the Molasses Act and “salutary neglect” was the 
clear commitment of the Grenville government that this duty would now be collected. 
To execute this Act, the navy and the customs authority were strengthened and the 
jurisdiction of Vice-Admiralty Courts was extended. A new vice-admiralty court with 
extensive jurisdiction, but not appellate, was set up in Halifax to prosecute violators in 
“all America”, but in reality the new court was mostly utilized for suits against New 
England, whose reputation for smuggling was the worst in the colonies. The judges did 
not receive any salary, but were instead paid small fees granted by the colonial 
assemblies. 
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Parliament had also authorized the use of military staff and navy ships to support 
customs authorities.  
The Sugar Act had an ambiguous result: the acceptance of the Sugar Act made 
Grenville complacent about the acceptance of another tax, namely the Stamp Act, which 
he started to prepare in 1763. It had a different significance for the American colonists: 
it was the Sugar Act which created a sense of victimization and prompted an outburst of 
colonial opposition to the Stamp Act, causing a much more intense public dispute about 
fundamental questions of constitutional principles.  
Secondly, it is possible to quantify the economic impact resulting from the change from 
“salutary neglect” to an enforced collection of this tax, from the bribe of one penny to 
three pence per gallon – a move which reduced the margin of the New England 
distilleries. 
 
Table 14. The revenue of the Sugar Act
153
 between 1765 and 1767 in pounds. 
 
Year Tax Revenue 
1765 14,091 
1766 26,696 
1767 33,844 
 
Table 14 shows the steep increase in revenue and thus the Sugar Act can be described as 
the first act of the Grenville administration with the clear purpose to tax the colonies 
rather than to regulate trade. 
Reid
154
 argues that most protests against the Sugar Act were based on economic 
considerations, especially objections to the new statute because of the impact on the cost 
of doing trade. Indeed, there were a number of protests by the provincial assemblies but 
most of their petitions dealt with the economic issues and hardships. 
As far as constitutional objections are concerned, Reid describes a nontax provision in 
the Sugar Act, namely “the enforcement of the law´s criminal parts in the court of vice-
admiralty.” This section had replaced the jurisdiction of the colonial judiciaries with an 
imperial tribunal of judges appointed by the Crown. 
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A further conclusion on the constitutional issue was the existing confusion among the 
colonial elite as to how to react to this act - a majority of whom had interpreted it as a 
regulatory statute having economic and commercial impact on the colonies. Whilst 
Daniel Dulany accepted the authority of Parliament to regulate trade, James Otis denied 
the right of Parliament to tax British colonists without their consent. 
“As early as June 1764, after realizing that their failure to have raised constitutional 
objections had been interpreted as conceding authority to tax the colonies for purposes 
of revenue, members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives made clear what 
they thought was the issue: [T]he Silence of the Province should have been imputed to 
any Cause, even to Dispair, rather than be construed into a tacit Cession of their Rights, 
or an Acknowledgement of a Right in the Parliament of Great-Britain to impose Duties 
and Taxes upon a People, who are not represented in the House of Commons.”155 
It can be argued that the Sugar Act highly sensitized the colonial elite and laid the 
foundation for the eruptive reaction of the American colonies when the Stamp Act was 
put into effect in March 1765. 
As James Otis aptly put it: “One single Act of Parliament….has set people a thinking in 
six months, more than they had done in their whole lives.”156 
 
 
5.4. The Stamp Act  
 
The British decision to station an army and the idea to tax the American colonies to pay 
for their defense was a sort of a “legacy” from the former Bute administration and 
marked a milestone in and significant departure from previous parliamentary and 
assemblies’ behavior. The option to subsidize local voluntary troops for colonial 
peacetime protection was never evaluated by the Imperial administration because of 
widespread desertion during the Seven Year´s War; no alternative was seen to regular 
British troops. 
 The Stamp Act can be characterized as Grenville´s attempt to lessen the disparity 
between the power and the responsibility between the colonies and the Empire and to 
gain the assistance of the colonies in making a contribution to the cost of the British 
standing army. The Stamp Act was clearly a levy on internal revenue in the colonies, 
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and the most significant aspect was the fact it had been imposed by British Parliament 
in which the colonists were not represented. 
This dispute was caused by a constitutional and political contradiction: “that although 
only Parliament could constitutionally tax British subjects, Parliament could not 
constitutionally tax British subjects in North America due to the doctrine of consent.”157  
The position of the Grenville administration was twofold: taxation was part of the 
sovereign power of Parliament and absolute sovereignty could not be restrained or 
limited. Thus there were no grounds for the claim that the doctrine could not exist in the 
British constitution. 
Secondly, George Grenville did believe that the doctrine of consent to taxation did not 
require representation as he regarded Parliament as the representative legal body, based 
on his principle that “the supreme legislature represents all the subjects of the state.”158 
Tucker and Hendrickson describe the crucial impact of the Stamp Act crisis, which is 
somehow seen as “one of several” successive disputes in transatlantic relations: “If the 
decade long crisis that was to lead from resistance to rebellion is considered as a drama, 
the opposition to the Stamp Act appears as the first act. …The Stamp Act crisis was not 
merely one act in a much larger drama; it was very nearly the drama itself.”159 
As “this subject was new to none”, the Bute ministry already devoted much time to 
deliberating the matter and collecting information before presenting this new tax to the 
House of Commons.  
Following these preliminary deliberations, this tax matter was deferred until the 
following session. When the Earl of Bute had to resign and Grenville became first Lord 
of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, it became his task to put this tax 
measure through legislation and finally to implement and execute the Stamp Act. As 
stamp duties had been a common means to raise taxes in Britain since the end of the 
seventeenth century, Grenville did not expect this tax matter to be controversial or 
difficult to execute. There was, after all, a legal precedent – the Sugar Act – which 
seemed to have been accepted in the colonies. In addition, in New York and 
Massachusetts the colonists were already paying stamp duties levied by their colonial 
assemblies.  
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Perkins points out a basic difference between the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act: “Unlike 
the duties on imports, the stamp levies were not hidden in the prices of consumer goods. 
They were instead highly visible taxes.”160  
During the summer of 1763 G. Grenville asked his personal secretary Thomas Whately 
to prepare such a bill. Whately contacted several colonial agents and discussed at first 
an option which was intended to let the colonies raise a tax among themselves: a sum 
appropriate to that expected from the stamp tax to avoid being taxed by Parliament. 
Grenville gave the colonists a year to make suggestions for raising appropriate internal 
revenue. Several colonies indicated their willingness to contribute to the British 
Treasury – if called upon to do so in a regular, constitutional manner – but such a 
clearly defined request was never made by Grenville.  
On May, 17, 1764, a conference took place between Grenville and colonial agents 
which can be seen as a tactical maneuver: by withholding necessary information, the 
colonies would not be in a position to raise an “equivalent” sum but Parliament would 
reward this offer to the colonies.  
Besides the political tactics of Grenville, the inadequacy of the British approach was to 
perceive and treat the thirteen colonies as one political unit with common political 
interests, but the assemblies were incapable of finding a common formula for making 
contributions on the scale Britain expected to raise. 
Massachusetts made an attempt to prevent a parliamentary taxation and Governor 
Bernard described the main obstacle of finding an appropriate tax rate per province in a 
letter, dated August 18, 1764 as follows: “That it was impossible at present to proceed 
to an actual taxation, until the demands of the ministry should be further explained. That 
if every province was to be left to raise the Money in what manner they pleased, the 
particular sum expected from each province as their proportion must be first 
ascertained……That neither of these things can be done by the provinces themselves, 
they must be settled by some authority that can mediate between the provinces and 
moderate their partialities for themselves.” 161 
It was unrealistic to suggest that the colonies should fix the proportions of taxation 
themselves and hence giving the colonies the opportunity to make alternative 
suggestions was bound to fail from the very beginning.  
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What Grenville had given to the colonies was not an opportunity to tax themselves but 
an opportunity to refuse to tax themselves.
162
 
The “hidden agenda” of the Stamp Act was also to weaken the emerging position of the 
colonial assemblies: if Parliament were to collect taxes, the assemblies could run the 
risk of losing the power of the purse entirely and the governors would have been glad to 
regain power and political influence again. 
A conference took place on February 2
nd
, 1765 where the colonial agents had to realize 
that the option of letting the colonies tax themselves just was a rhetorical gesture and 
Grenville was already determined to impose a stamp tax. 
On February 6
th
, the debate on the Stamp Act started and emphasized the Parliament’s 
right to levy the tax. The second reading took place on February 15
th
 and the opposition 
had prepared a petition against the bill. But the petition was refused to be considered: 
first, because it was contrary to the custom of the House of Commons to hear petitions 
against money bills and second because it would cast doubt on the authority of 
Parliament. When receiving petitions of the Massachusetts House, Thomas Whately 
clearly denied any acknowledgement of these documents, explaining the Parliament´s 
position: “The House of Commons would not receive any petitions, however expressed, 
that implied a doubt of the right of Parliament to lay taxes. To receive the petitions 
would have been an acknowledgement that the right was questionable, which we cannot 
admit.”163 
On March 22, the Stamp Act passed the third reading and was put into effect. 
This bill consisted of 25 pages and prescribes taxes for fifteen classes of documents. 
Papers to file at court, for clearing ships, diplomas, appointments, bonds, grants and 
deeds for land, pamphlets, newspapers, playing cards, contracts, mortgages, latest wills. 
All these documents had to carry a stamp, embossed by the Treasury Office. 
The highest tax – 10 pounds – was imposed on attorneys´ licenses. Papers related to 
court proceedings were taxed between 3 pence and 3 shillings, land grants up to 100 
acres 6 pence, then 2 pence per incremental 120 acres, newspapers 1 pence per page and 
pamphlets 1 shilling per sheet.  
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The Stamp Act revenue was expected to raise 40,000 pounds, about 10 percent of the 
annual cost of the British garrisons, payable in gold or silver cash – a fact which 
aggravated the crisis. 
On the one hand the Stamp Act fees produced a highly visible tax, but in economic 
terms it was a sort of “quantité négligeable” as the cost for an average tax payer was 5 
pence a year, or 0.2 percent of per capita incomes
164
. The logical conclusion was that 
objections could not be based on economic impact, so they had to be of a constitutional 
nature. 
Jack M. Sosin
165
 points to an important decision by G. Grenville to calm the alarmed 
colonists, who feared that they could be drained of money by the new taxes as there was 
an ongoing shortage of specie. To avoid harming the colonial economy, the ministry 
issued definite instructions “to ensure that money raised in the colonies by the new 
revenue would not leave America.”166 Thus it was the basic intention of the Stamp Act 
to defray the expenses of the British army in the American colonies, but the revenue for 
this purpose would have remained in the colonies. 
John P. Reid raises an important question: why did the American colonists perceive the 
Sugar Act and the Stamp Act so differently? 
“An obvious answer, based on the eighteenth-century jurisprudence, is that the Sugar 
Act of 1764 was perceived as a continuation of the Sugar Act of 1733, an adaptation of 
an existing, long-accepted system, changed from a law exclusively regulating trade to 
one both regulating trade and raising incidental revenue; as such it was sanctioned by 
constitutional custom. The Stamp Act, by contrast, was a new tax without precedent; it 
was, therefore, an unconstitutional innovation.” 167  
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5.5. The Stamp Act Congress 
 
“On June 6, 1765, the Massachusetts House of Representatives, initiated by James Otis, 
resolved to propose an inter-colonial meeting to resist the Stamp Act. On June 8, it sent 
a circular letter to the assemblies of the other colonies inviting them to meet at New 
York the following October to consider a general and united, dutiful, loyal and humble 
Representation of their Condition to His Majesty and the Parliament; and to implore 
Relief.”168  
Of the thirteen colonies which later took part in the Revolution, nine responded to the 
invitation. New Hampshire declined but formally approved the proceedings after the 
congress was over. Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia did not participate because 
their governors refused to convene the assemblies to elect delegates. Twenty-seven 
delegates took part in the congress – in Britain this congress was widely regarded as an 
illegal assembly including its outcome - the petition itself denied Parliament’s right of 
taxation. 
Under the headline of the “rights and privileges of the British American Colonists” the 
Stamp Act Congress met in New York in October 1765 and worked out a declaration 
which tried to balance the denial of Parliament’s authority to tax the colonies with an 
acknowledgement of what authority it did have, namely subordination. As in the 
previous discourses, the question was not about the inexpediency of the Stamp Act; this 
Act was seen as unconstitutional and therefore contrary to the rights of the colonies. 
After the congress had written down their official position in “The Declarations of the 
Stamp Act Congress”169, three committees drafted a petition to be presented to the King, 
a memorial to the House of Lords, and a petition to the House of Commons, expressing  
the Parliament’s authority to pass legislation to regulate trade but denying the right to 
tax:  
“3rd. That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted 
rights of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them, but with their own 
consent, given personally, or by their representatives. 
4th. That the people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances, 
cannot be represented in the house of commons in Great Britain. 
                                                 
168
 Morgan, Edmund, Stamp Act Crisis, The University of North Carolina Press, Williamsburg, 1995,  
 p. 108. 
169
 Morgan, Edmund, Prologue to Revolution. Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-
1766, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1959, p. 62-69. 
65 | P a g e  
 
5th. That the only representatives of the people of these colonies are persons chosen 
therein by themselves; and that no taxes ever have been, or can be constitutionally 
imposed on them, but by their respective legislatures.”170 
In this document of 1765 the colonists had clearly drawn the line where they believed 
that British Parliament should stop and stated clear denials of Parliament’s right to tax 
the colonies.  
 
5.6. The Repeal of the Stamp Act 
 
The colonial resistance
171
 to the Stamp Act started in early 1765 and lasted for nearly a 
year until the legislation was repealed. At first, Patrick Henry, a member of the Virginia 
House of Burgess, introduced five resolutions, as Virginia had taken the most radical 
position among the colonies to fight the Stamp Act. 
In addition to the non-importation agreement of colonial merchants and the Stamp Act 
Congress – detailed in a later paragraph and in Chapter 6.1., – agitation by a group of 
Bostonians
172
, who called themselves The Loyal Nine and later, the Sons of Liberty had 
led to an outbreak of street violence on August 14, 1765, when the angry crowd hanged 
an effigy of the appointed stamp distributor Andrew Oliver, demolishing his newly built 
Stamp Office. Later in August, the mansion of Chief Justice Hutchinson was devastated, 
too. 
The starting date to execute the Stamp Act was November 1, 1765 and from that date 
on, no ships would be cleared until the Stamp Act was accepted. The opposing parties, 
the governor and the protesters had become caught in a deadlock situation. If the ports 
were to be closed, a famine would have been the result, but if the imperial 
administration were to accept business transactions without stamps, in violation of the 
Stamp Act, they would have acted unlawfully. 
George Grenville made a mistake by appointing native Americans as stamp masters for 
they were unable to withstand the public pressure of their fellow countrymen and 
resigned even before the Stamp Act went into force. The imperial administration had to 
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face up to the fact that no one dared to act as a stamp distributor; as a consequence, the 
Stamp Act could not be implemented. 
It was now up to Britain to respond to the colonists´ resistance. 
In Britain, insurmountable tensions between George III and George Grenville – over 
matters which had nothing to do with the colonies – had led to the resignation of the 
Prime Minister in July 1765. The following government under the Duke of Cumberland 
and the Marquis of Rockingham as head of treasury had inherited this dilemma with the 
Stamp Act: the problem was to balance economically and politically the ongoing 
complaints of the English merchants about the colonies´ drastic boycott of British 
goods, but also to uphold the unquestioned authority of British Parliament for all parts 
of the empire. 
To increase public pressure on government drastically, two hundred colonial merchants 
signed the “The New York Agreement”173 on October 31, 1765, the day before the 
Stamp Act was to go into effect: 
“First. That in all orders they send out to Great Britain for goods or merchandise of any 
nature, kind, or quality whatsoever, usually imported from Great Britain, they will direct 
their correspondents not to ship them unless the Stamp Act be repealed. 
Secondly. It is further unanimously agreed that all orders already sent home, shall be 
countermanded by the very first conveyance; and the goods and merchandise thereby 
ordered, not to be sent unless upon the condition mentioned in the foregoing resolution.  
Thirdly. It is further unanimously agreed that no merchant will vend any goods or 
merchandise sent upon commission from Great Britain that shall be shipped from thence 
after the first day of January next unless upon the condition mentioned in the first 
resolution.” 
To make matters worse, the Prime Minister, the Duke of Cumberland, died on October 
31, 1765 and Rockingham was in charge of the government. 
Rockingham had few options to terminate the Stamp Act crisis and he preferred 
amending the Stamp Act, but at the end of 1765 he decided to repeal it. 
“To Rockingham, the only alternative to repeal seemed to be a ruinous civil war in 
America, but as the king´s chief minister, he could hardly tell Parliament that the 
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world´s greatest empire must yield to unruly mobs. He needed a better reason to 
repeal.”174 
Rockingham started to mobilize British merchants who traded with the colonies by 
encouraging them to send petitions to Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act in order to end 
Grenville´s “economic disaster”.  By doing this, Rockingham got the political 
momentum he needed to act. 
The Stamp Act was politically seen as the cause for the economic depression in colonial 
and British trade; therefore repeal was seen as a step to resettle the Anglo-American 
relations in terms of exports, and the Declaratory Act (see Chapter 5.1.) was an 
appropriate political means affirming the supremacy of the British Parliament. The non-
importation strategy of the colonists had fully achieved the desired effect. The London 
merchants sent a petition to the Lord Mayors in England during March 1766 following a 
petition to the House of Commons in which they called for the legislation to be 
repealed. In it, they complained that “Acts…granting and applying certain Stamp 
Duties….have so far interrupted the usual and former most fruitful Branches of their 
Commerce, restrained the Sale of their Produce….”175 
Trying to balance the interests of the merchants with those of Parliament, Rockingham 
brokered a compromise even though the opponents of Parliament´s right to tax 
represented no more than a small minority. The leading opponent besides Pitt, Lord 
Camden – described by a contemporary as “the people´s lawyer” – insisted during the 
Parliament’s session that taxation and representation were inseparable and “whoever 
attempts to take what is a man´s own without his consent commits a robbery”.176 
To Camden, the British constitution was derived from natural law and he claimed 
“taxation and representation are inseparably united; God hath joined them, no British 
Parliament can separate them.”177 
In response to Camden´s claim of “robbery”, The Lord Chief Justice Mansfield argued 
that “consent” was a very general term with no precise meaning and furthermore, 
Mansfield found no evidence of colonial response to parliamentary acts, where the 
                                                 
174
 Murrin, John M. et al., Liberty, Equality, Power, Thomas Wadsworth, Boston 2008, p. 190. 
175
 Ibid. p. 130. 
176
 Tucker, Robert W., Hendrickson, David C., The Fall of the First British Empire, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1982, p. 167-169. 
177
 Reid, John, Ph., Constitutional History of the American Revolution, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison 1987, p. 88. 
68 | P a g e  
 
colonies claimed “unqualified authority of Parliament to legislate for the colonies” until 
the Stamp Act had been issued. 
“The ministry´s attitude was succinctly summarized at the time by General Conway, the 
secretary of state for the Southern Department, who declared that he never was nor ever 
shall be a friend to internal taxation in America, as he did not deny the legal right, but 
he thought “in point of policy and justice this ought not to have been attempted.”178 
He secured the repeal of the Stamp Act, but issued a Declaratory Act reaffirming that 
Parliament "had, hath, and of right ought to have, full power and authority to make laws 
and statutes of sufficient force and vitality to bind the colonies and people of America, 
subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever."
179
  
As a result, colonists could not take exception to any Parliamentary law, including those 
authorizing taxation. Thus, the Rockingham ministry reaffirmed the supremacy of 
Parliament generally, based on two principles laid down by Lord Chief Justice 
Mansfield
180
: 
1
st
, That the British legislature, as to the power of making laws, represents the whole 
empire, and has authority to bind every part and every subject without the least 
distinction, whether such subjects have a right to vote or not, or whether the law binds 
places within the realm or without. 
2
nd
, That the colonists, by the condition on which they migrated, settled, and now exist, 
are more emphatically subjects of Great Britain than those within the realm; and that the 
British legislature have in every instance exercised their right of legislation over them 
without any dispute or question the 14
th
 of January last. 
Mansfield´s argument for the first principle was based on the existing architecture: in 
Great Britain the legislative power is lodged in parliament, the executive power in the 
crown.  
From the beginning of the Stamp Act crisis to its termination by the Declaratory Act 
there was a given consensus in the British political establishment about the authority of 
Parliament to legislate “on any and all matters affecting the colonies.”181 
To quote the “Act Repealing the Stamp Act”, dated March 18, 1766:182 
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“…whereas the continuance of the said act would be attended with many 
inconveniences, and may be productive of consequences greatly detrimental to the 
commercial interests of these kingdoms…….shall be, and is and are hereby repealed…” 
  
5.7. The Quartering Act  
 
In 1765 the Parliament passed the Quartering Act which committed colonial residents to 
provision quarters and food to British soldiers serving in America. This act again 
outraged the colonists who believed the regulations were against the law and also 
questioned why a standing British army needed to remain in North America. Like the 
Stamp Act of the same year, it also was an assertion of British authority over the 
colonies, in disregard of the fact that troop financing had been exercised for 150 years 
by representative provincial assemblies rather than by Parliament in London. 
The Quartering Act
183
 of 1765 imposed an “unfunded mandate” on colonial 
government: ” ...such constables, tithingmen [parish officer], magistrates, and other civil 
officers as aforesaid, are hereby required to quarter and billet the officers and soldiers, 
in his Majesty’s service, in the barracks provided by the colonies;” 
The colonists opposed the Quartering Act claiming it breached the Bill of Rights
184
 
(1689): 
“By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without 
consent of Parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law;” 
The Third Amendment to the United States Constitution
185
 can be seen as a reaction to 
the regulations of the Quartering Act:  
“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the 
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”  
The reaction of the colonists was largely negative and was rooted in two issues:  
Traditional antipathy towards standing armies: There was a clear colonial preference to 
rely on a flexible militia system for temporary military service to settle a particular 
conflict. 
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Cost: The expenses for the British standing army were approx. 350,000 pounds for 
10,000 soldiers per year. In the mid-1760s the risk of an attack by the French appeared 
to be unlikely. Many colonists concluded that the purpose of British troops in America 
was to assure the execution of the coercive British program and to keep control on the 
American colonies. 
5.8. The Townshend Duties of 1767 
 
The intention of the repeal of the Stamp Act was to reconcile the political crisis between 
the colonies and the mother country in order to restore the status quo before Grenville´s 
Stamp Act. As noted earlier, Grenville had already been dismissed on July 10, 1765 by 
King George III – some months before the Stamp Act crisis became resolved. 
The second reason for imperial appeasement was to end the colonial boycott of British 
goods and in so doing, to restore the commercial relations.  
This very pragmatic repeal of the Stamp Act did not provide any long-term solution to 
the complex issue of colonial administration and a consensus on the rights of taxation as 
Parliament had only made a tactical concession. Quoting Middleton in this respect: 
“The belief remained that Parliament had the right to tax and that the Americans ought 
to make a greater contribution to the costs of empire. Many Britons were concerned that 
this wider competence of Parliament to legislate had been implicitly questioned. Hence 
it was only a matter of time before an attempt was made to assert the claims laid down 
in the Declaratory Act.” 186 
The Rockingham ministry fell in July 1766 and William Pitt the Elder became prime 
minister. King George III, who hoped to have founded a stable ministry, was willing to 
work on conciliation with the colonists – Pitt was very popular in the colonies as he had 
opposed an American tax from the very beginning. From the very outset, Pitt argued it 
would be foolish to provoke strong denial of the colonies or even a potential revolution 
over 100,000 pounds a year when colonial trade exceeded two million pounds. 
Pitt was elevated to the peerage as the Earl of Chatham when he decided to go to the 
Lords. Dickinson
187
 argues that Pitt´s decision to go to the Lords was a mistake as “his 
great strength had been in the House of Commons, where his powerful rhetoric and 
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imposing personality could sway opinion.” As a result of his decision, he was no longer 
able to control the Commons from the Lords. 
Pitt appointed the Duke of Grafton as First Lord of the Treasury and Charles 
Townshend as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Commons.  
An acute depression, followed by a long-lasting illness of William Pitt, terminated  
Chatham´s ministry and Charles Townshend took advantage of his absence and 
assumed leadership of Parliament, but also took charge of colonial policy in the spring 
of 1767. 
In early 1767 Parliament decided to reduce the land tax in England drastically, reducing 
home revenue by as much as half a million pounds a year
188
 and in addition, the repeal 
of the Stamp Act had significantly cut the expected revenues of the Crown. 
Charles Townshend returned again to Grenville's fiscal policy for the colonies and  
reopened the financial demands on the colonies to raise revenue in the colonies in order 
to reduce the deficit and – even more important – to break the power of the colonial 
assemblies, which used “the power of the purse” to control the expenses for governors 
and judges and to make them independent of them.  
To compensate for the deficit of reduced property tax, Charles Townshend proposed 
legislation that would raise revenue from various taxes directed at the colonists and in 
addition, he wanted to pay the salaries of governors, judges and other imperial officials 
in the colonies from taxes raised by the British parliament, but he did not intend to use 
these duties to cover the costs of defending America. As a former member of the Board 
of Trade he had experienced the dependence of royal officials on salaries paid by the 
local assemblies. 
Townshend exploited the distinction between “internal” and “external” taxation and 
declared the Act valid for the sole purpose for the control of trade – in the guise of a 
Navigation Act – by levying custom duties on tea, paints, glass, paper and lead and he 
expected 40,000 pounds on the selected items. All these enumerated goods had to be 
imported from Britain on British ships, and by taxing at source, the evasion of taxes and 
duties was nearly impossible. The financial burden imposed by the Townshend duties 
can be regarded as “a nuisance”, therefore the colonies realized the real threat posed by 
the Townshend Acts – it was not the economic issue, it set a the precedent for further 
taxes. 
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As the general committee of Charles Town, South Carolina, explained, the Townshend 
tax “is only designed to be a precedent, whereon the future vassalage of these colonies 
may be established.”189 The Townshend Acts also reorganized the American customs 
administration and established a board of customs commissioners. Before the 
administration was implemented, the American customs revenue yielded about 2,000 
pounds a year at a cost of 9,000 pounds, after the reorganization they yielded 30,000 
pounds at a cost of 13,000 pounds. To support the proper enforcement of these Acts, 
Parliament reaffirmed the power of the admiralty courts to issue writs of assistance – 
general search warrants – throughout the colonies. As the court in Halifax had proved 
too remote, additional Admiralty Courts were established at Halifax, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and Charleston. After the Stamp Act crisis, Townshend strongly believed 
that executive authority had to be strengthened and that the colonies had to be brought 
more in line with British direction and governance.  
Townshend regarded this distinction between the internal and external taxation as 
nonsense, “but by taking the Americans at their word he would be able to achieve what 
he wanted without repeating the mistakes which Grenville had made with his Stamp 
Act.”190  
In his pamphlet “Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British 
Colonies”, published in 1765 – and thus before the Townshend Acts – Daniel Dulany, 
an influential spokesman in the colonies, made the distinction between the two different 
forms of taxation: “A Right to impose an internal Tax on the Colonies without their 
consent, for the single Purpose of Revenue, is denied; a Right to regulate their Trade 
without their Consent is admitted.” 
Consequently, Townshend could claim that his newly imposed duties were in line with 
the colonial view of taxation.  
The American reaction to the Townshend Duties was “initially muted, and for a short 
while it seemed that his ploy might work.”191 The Massachusetts House of 
Representatives started the protests, sending a circular letter to all colonial assemblies, 
arguing that this Act was violating the colonists´ fundamental rights. 
The discussion over strategies of resistance divided the colonists. “A policy of non-
importation would be easier to implement, but British trade played a bigger role in the 
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colonial economy than North American trade did in the British economy. To hurt 
Britain a little, the colonies would have to harm themselves a lot.”192 
 
6. Wealth and Poverty in the American Colonies 
 
This chapter is predominantly based upon Gary B. Nash´s essay about pre-revolutionary 
urban radicalism
193
. 
Before analyzing the urban area of Boston, an overview of the distribution of wealth in 
the 13 colonies shows an uneven distribution, ranging from 38 pounds in the New 
England colonies to 137 pounds in the Southern colonies, mainly caused by the 
ownership of slaves and an oppressive labor system in the South. This slave-based 
economy which started at the end of the seventeenth century caused this asymmetric 
distribution, compared to merchant-based economy of New England. Through the use 
of slaves, an expansion of cultivated land in the Southern colonies enabled structural 
transformations in terms of “economies of scale”.  
Table 15. The distribution of wealth in the American colonies
194
 
 
 
Source: Alice Hanson Jones, Components of Private Wealth per Free Capita for the 13 
Colonies by Region, 1774, in: US Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 
1970, Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1976, Series Z, 169-212, p. 1175. 
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As shown in Table 15, the New England colonies can be characterized as the colonial 
“problem area” in terms of poverty, compared to the mean values and the other two 
regions. 
But how was the distribution of wealth within the New England colonies? 
 
Table 16. Distribution of physical wealth in New England, 1770, and in the Middle 
colonies, 1774.
195
  
This table presents the relation between selected segments of the population and their 
share of wealth. The poorest 50% of the New England colonies had an accumulated 
share of wealth of 11%. 
 
 
 
Source: Alice Hanson Jones, “Wealth Estimates for the New England Colonies about 1770”, 
Journal of Economic History, XXXII (1972), p. 119 and “Wealth Estimates for the 
American Middle Colonies , 1774, Economic Development and Cultural Change, XVIII 
(1970), part 2. 
 
The cumulative Table 16 clearly shows very distinctly that there was an uneven 
distribution of wealth in the New England colonies. Such was also the case based on the 
lowest wealth among all colonial regions (Table 15). 
These figures show us a complex and diverse society in New England, one which 
“facilitated the formation of group identity and increased the prospect of organized and 
social conflicts.”196 
Nash describes the visible changes in social structures and a generally recognized trend 
toward “a less even distribution of wealth”, as evidenced by the tax lists for Boston, 
Philadelphia and New York. 
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“By the early 1770s the top 5% of Boston´s taxpayers controlled 49 percent of the 
taxable assets of the community, whereas they had held only 30 percent in 1687. In 
Philadelphia the top twentieth increased its share of wealth from 33 to 55 percent 
between 1693 and 1774. Those in the lower half of society, who in Boston in 1687 had 
commanded 9 percent of the taxable wealth, were left collectively with a mere 5 percent 
in 1771. In Philadelphia, those in the lower half of the wealth spectrum saw their share 
of wealth drop from 10.1 to 3.3 percent in the same period.”197 
Supported by urban growth, a wealthy upper class appeared, owning personal estates 
worth up to 5,000 pounds sterling in 1730, whereas in 1750 the wealthiest dwellers 
owned 20,000 pounds sterling, some even 50,000 pounds. 
This social disparity in terms of wealth and the rapidly changing economic conditions in 
America clearly interacted with the two colonial mainstream ideologies: For one there 
was the Whig ideology, which was borrowed from England, appealed to the upper 
levels of the colonial society and defended constitutional rights and liberty. 
In contrast, the popular ideology went beyond the discourse about constitutional rights 
and also addressed the substantial social issues of wealth distribution and the social 
system of the colonial society. This popular ideology initiated the politicization of the 
artisan and laboring classes, which organized strong urban resistance and became 
politically involved in the closing decades of the colonial period. 
The basic changes in the Atlantic economy – the colonial recession and the credit crisis 
of 1762-1764 – caused a competitive situation between merchants and artisans. 
An increasing number of colonial merchants served as agents for British manufacturers 
and imported expanding volumes of relatively cheap goods on favorable credit terms. 
This unfavorable trend of a highly competitive economic environment led to a lower 
generation of margins and profit, and one result was a declining number of taxpaying 
populations.  
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Table 17. Rateable Polls in Boston, 1728-1771
198
 
  
Table 17 shows the declining number of taxable persons, compared to a relatively static 
number of inhabitants of Boston. Between the peak of 1735 and mid-century, the city 
lost approximately one thousand taxable persons. In terms of percentage, the number of 
people paying taxes fell from 23% in 1735 to 16% in 1750. 
Nash sees this downward trend of the urban artisan and lower class as a consequence of 
widespread economic frustration, which became manifest when George Grenville began 
to tighten the control over and increase fiscal contributions of the colonies. 
Boston was struck first by long-lasting poverty after the Seven Year´s War and there the 
link between the vast increase in the number of poor and rising political radicalism 
became most obvious. As already mentioned, Boston allocated 60 percent of the local 
tax revenue to charity. 
The growing discrepancy between wealth and related power as well as the large class of 
the poor in Boston society had brought an evolving radical mode to the urban centers of 
the American colonies. Gary B. Nash
199
 characterizes this transformation by the 
activation of previously quiescent lower-class poor, the emerging public influence of 
political clubs and literature and an involvement of the clergy and the churches in 
politics and – as an additional element – the organization of mobs and violence for 
political purposes. 
This rising political antagonism in Boston between the Whig and the popular ideology 
is closely related to two personalities: Thomas Hutchinson and James Otis. 
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In the 1760s, Hutchinson took over the leadership of a small group of conservative 
merchants and lawyers, known as the “Junto”. This movement stood for fiscal 
conservatism, but also for their attempt to limit popular participation in government and 
transfer control of Boston to the elite, in order to improve order and efficiency of the 
town meetings. Besides this, the members of this group were close friends with the 
newly appointed Royal governor Francis Bernard.  
Hutchinson failed in his attempt to manipulate the elections for town government on 
May 13
th
, 1760. Immediately after this election, James Otis started his political rise with 
the “popular” party in Boston, reflecting the perceptions and interests of ordinary 
Bostonians, fighting the Hutchinson circle and the Royal governor and his allies. 
“Only by understanding the long animosity that the common people of Boston held for 
Thomas Hutchinson and his clique can sense be made of the extraordinary response to 
the Stamp Act in Boston in August 1765 – the systematic destruction of the house of 
Hutchinson and other wealthy and conservative Boston officials – and of course of 
revolutionary politics in the city in the years that followed.”200 
And Nash calls the Stamp Act riots an example of the “moral economy of the crowd” in 
that early stage of the revolutionary movement and the culmination of resistance against 
rising wealth and oligarchic power in Boston. 
The conclusion of the ideological background of the pre-revolutionary period shows a 
layering of colonial society along economic lines: the established, rich and powerful 
elite, for which additional taxation did not mean any material threat; they entered the 
intellectual and theoretical discourse with British officials in order to expand self-
government. 
The second layer was the majority of poor people who expressed their antipathy to 
wealth and privilege on both sides of the Atlantic and developed an emerging class 
consciousness because of their economic hardship. This inner-colonial disparity laid the 
foundation for resistance against and pressure on the governing elites, and this emerged 
when George Grenville asked for an increase of tax revenue - something which was 
definitely a material threat to the urban poor. 
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7. Findings, Analysis and Conclusions 
When the Peace of Paris was settled in 1763, British statesmen needed to develop a new 
post-war concept for a colonial empire which had largely extended by territory and 
population and had already developed into a self-sufficient society with mature political 
institutions.  
The author set about to analyze three questions which had a major impact on 
transatlantic relations. These three areas are: 
-  The decision to establish a standing army in the colonies with all related 
consequences of this initial decision,  
- The economic relations under trade restrictions,  
- The prejudicial impact of the repeal of the Stamp Act on Parliament´s 
supremacy. 
 
 
7.1. The Decision in favor of  a Standing Army in the Colonies 
 
Having conquered vast new land on the North-American continent, an appropriate 
military force was needed for the effective occupation and protection of this large 
territory. 
Since the French military threat had been removed, the need for British military 
protection was no longer felt by the colonists. However British Government still feared 
possible wars with hostile Indians – the Pontiac Rebellion was a strong indication and 
left a deep impression on the imperial officials – or even with the French and 
furthermore, the obedience of ninety-thousand Catholic Canadians could not be taken 
for granted. 
It was Lord Bute who took the first decision on continuous military presence in March 
1763 for the post-war period. Following the inadequate military support and of the 
requisition system of the colonies during the Seven Year´s War, he believed in the 
military incompetency of the American colonies: he agreed to keep fifteen battalions in 
the mainland colonies and five in the West Indies, in total ten thousand soldiers.
201
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Anderson disagrees with the contention that there was “inadequate military support” 
and shows in Table 18 that the colonies did indeed supply a high percentage of the 
volunteers requested. 
 
Table 18. Percentage of colonial volunteer soldiers requested, by province
202
 
 
 
Table 18 shows the fulfillment rate of requested volunteer soldiers according to 
province – the figures represent in total 81.4 percent in 1759 (16,835 servicemen out of 
20,680 requested soldiers) , a slight reduction to 75.3 percent  (15,942 out of  21,180) in 
1760, 80.1 percent (9,296 out of 11607) in 1761 and finally a high of 90.5 percent 
(9,204 out of 10,173) in 1762, as parliamentary subsidies helped to meet the Crown´s 
call for soldiers. British political leaders received misleading reports from colonial 
officials and these tended to distort the view of conditions on the ground in America and 
thus British perceptions. 
Jack P. Greene
203
 argues that the decision to station regular troops in the colonies “was 
apparently for their defense, but also to keep them in proper subjection to the Mother 
Country.” The proclamation line also supported the political and economic control 
function over the old colonies as they could not found new settlements beyond this 
boundary. The cost of this standing army forced the Grenville administration to impose 
new duties on the American colonies for co-financing. Fierce opposition in the 
American provinces finally led to the Stamp Act crisis. 
Britain regarded the old and new territories in America as a strategic asset which would 
generate significant future revenue for the motherland. 
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This military presence was embedded in a system of colonial restrictions: 
Table 19. Overview of decisions and acts and their major impacts. 
 
 Impact on American Colonies Impact on Britain 
Keeping a post-war 
standing army  
Fear of military control and 
suppression of civil protest. 
Cost of 250,000-350,000 p.a. 
Proclamation Line Restricting westward expansion of 
the colonies. 
Regulating trade with Indians. 
Ending “salutary neglect” and 
tighter control of the execution of 
existing law.  
Keeping the 13 colonies 
geographically under control. 
 Protection of Indian land to 
avoid further conflicts between 
colonists and Indians because 
of limited military resources. 
Stamp Act 
 
Imposing a new tax on colonists: 
target 40,000 pounds p.a. to 
contribute to the British expenses. 
Reducing British Land Tax and 
securing the supremacy of 
British parliament. 
Quartering Act Colonists challenged this coercive 
measure as an unconstitutional tax. 
Providing suitable 
accommodations for British 
soldiers in urban areas 
 
Even before the peace treaty of Paris, Lord Ligonier as the British commander-in-chief 
asked for a peace-time army of eighty-five regiments. Parliament objected because of 
the worsening budgetary situation in Britain, but finally agreed on seventy-five 
regiments under a unified command in New York – 8,050 officers and men – which 
were distributed as follows
204
: 
Table 20. Regional distribution of British troops in the American colonies, 1762. 
 
Region Troops 
Canada 3,650 
Nova Scotia, Cape Breton Island, Newfoundland 1,700 
Upper New York Posts 1,250 
Western Pennsylvania 400 
Michigan 350 
South Carolina and Georgia 450 
New York City Area 200 
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Compared to the number of troops at the end of the Seven Years´ War – 17,000205 – this 
number of remaining post-war troops in the colonies was approximately half of the 
military force during wartime. The minimum recurring cost per year for twenty 
battalions in the colonies amounted to at least 225,000 pounds, a sum which could not 
become added to a budget deficit of 146,000,000 pounds.
206
  
When the British government refused the colonial demand for a return to the requisition 
system, the British government saw no alternative but to discharge the responsibility for 
the security of the American colonies – which they had clearly assumed in 1754 – to 
regular British troops. 
According to Tucker and Hendrickson
207
, a colonial conference at Albany in 1754 
already envisaged a plan for a unified colonial defense policy which was based on a 
new council which would take over central responsibility. The delegates to this council 
were to be nominated by the lower houses of the provincial assemblies and this central 
institution was to have the power of taxation to finance the common colonial defense 
system. 
This plan failed because of unanimous rejection: the British would lose power and 
control over the colonies and had no formal assurance that this colonial institution 
would follow the intentions of the mother country. The provinces rejected it because of 
a lack of common – even conflicting - interests in matters of defense. 
The failure of the Albany conference illustrates the ongoing dilemma and ambiguous 
position of the British Empire: on the one side, the political intention that the colonies 
should provide the financing for their own security, on the other side the fear of an 
increasing “challenge to imperial authority”208. Thus, the issue of how to distribute the 
burden among the colonies remained unresolved. Already in this conference in 1754, 
the Board of Trade devised the formula that taxation could be based on “the number of 
inhabitants, trade, wealth and revenue of each Colony”209, but a system designed for 
wartime became irrelevant for the period of peace. It had been already initiated by Lord 
Bute, but G. Grenville ultimately realized that no other way than parliamentary taxation 
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could ensure a fair and executable distribution of the cost for the British soldiers in the 
colonies. These financial considerations led to a stamp tax, the Stamp Act and finally to 
the Stamp Act crisis and its repeal, a subject the author will return to in chapter 7.3. 
Fred Anderson adds another strategic fact to keep a reduced British peacetime force in 
place: to demobilize the British army would force hundreds of officers and thousands of 
ordinary soldiers into retirement on half pay. Whereas the social fate of the suddenly 
unemployed lower ranks caused little concern, the dismissal of more than a thousand 
officers was seen as a major issue. 
The solution was to keep the higher ranks and to reduce the number of enlisted men by 
one half. This decision maintained a structure of trained officers, whereas the lower 
ranks and recruits could become filled up at short notice. This in short explains the 
King´s offer to grant land – laid down in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (see also 
Chapter 4.1.) – in accordance to their ranks, ranging from five thousand down to fifty 
acres. 
The Royal Proclamation had some impact as westward expansion would inevitably lead 
to conflicts with the Indians. This issue had higher priority than limiting the western 
frontier of the colonists, but it cannot be characterized as the sole root-cause of the 
future conflicts between the mother-country and the American colonies. 
The administration of Indian affairs through commercial and political regulations was 
set forth in the 1763 proclamation and designed to eliminate the influence of the 13 
colonies by curbing land speculation and westward expansion for the time being. 
A further grievance for the colonists was the Quartering Act, which was highly 
unpopular in America and had led to strong resistance in New York. The Quartering Act 
was rather perceived as a coercive piece of legislation and an additional tax burden 
rather than a protective measure and therefore the colonists refused to fund the full cost 
requested by the British Army. 
In October 1767 this conflict escalated and as a consequence of this act of resistance the 
New York assembly was suspended until they accepted to fully fund the quartering. 
Before and during the Stamp Act riots of 1765 and early 1766, many colonists became 
suspicious about British intentions of the Quartering Act, which enabled the transfer of 
British troops from outpost garrisons into urban area. 
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To conclude this chapter and to resume the findings: 
- Britain´s government based its decision for a standing British Army in the 
colonies during peace-time on the negative war-time experience of the 
requisition system. 
- Britain still believed there was a risk of a new war, as the French had maintained 
friendly relations with the Indians as they had controlled the fur-trade. 
Furthermore, the Canadian population of about 60,000 people, mostly Catholics, 
had to become integrated in this emerged empire. 
 
This basic decision had three financial or emotional effects, ranked according to their 
impact: 
- This decision created a huge financial burden which had to be financed and 
shared between Mother Country and the colonies. 
      Together with the end of “salutary neglect”, Grenville’s attempt to implement a 
fair sharing of the cost of the standing army – the Stamp Act - created the most 
critical confrontation in transatlantic relations and was even worsened by the 
repeal of the Stamp Act. This central conflict will be discussed later. 
-   The ambiguous position taken by the colonists, indeed even their opposition to 
imperial protection in the form of a standing army was perceived as a coercive 
measure. The Quartering Act intensified this colonial fear, as this act enabled the 
deployment of British troops within urban areas. 
-    The Quartering Act was expressed as a grievance but looking at the number and 
geographical distribution of the troops, it affected mostly Canada and New 
England. The Middle and the Southern colonies were hardly challenged by this 
Act. 
 
The British decision to maintain a standing British army of 10,000 officers and soldiers 
in the American colonies was a root-cause of the imperial crisis: one the one hand the 
resulting financial burden and its fair distribution between the metropolis and the 
colonies and on the other hand the different perception of existing threats.  
Because the French had been defeated, the colonists did not feel the need for ongoing 
protection by the mother country, whereas British government still feared the danger of 
a renewed coalition of the French power and Indian tribes.  
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The dilemma of the British administration was to avoid any post-war vacuum in the 
security system and no alternative to a British detachment existed in the short term, 
because colonial assemblies insisted on raising troops in their own way and restricting 
the deployment and length of deployment of their troops.
210
 
 
7.2. The Economic Relation under British Restrictions 
 
Structuring such an expanded colonial empire in North America, a new concept for 
Britain´s post-war imperial policy had to become implemented as the policy of the past 
was seen as inappropriate. After the Seven Year´s War the pending problems of the 
empire were taken more seriously than in the period of “salutary neglect” and the vast 
North American colonial possessions had become much more important than ever 
before. 
In the words of Charles Andrews
211, “the discontinuity between the traditional policy of 
salutary neglect and the policy pursued in the 1760´s reflected a shift from a mercantile 
to an imperial outlook.” 
This radical change in the political paradigm changed from commercial relations, based 
on some trade laws which regulated the growth of the colonial commerce to a 
framework of centralization, control and authority.  
There was still much British concern about the role of the colonies as a crucial element 
in the balance of power between Great Britain and a revanchist France. The metropolis 
therefore felt the urgent need to retain the colonies under their control by a tightened 
relationship and a strong imperial authority.
212
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Table 21. The impact of the changes in trade regulations. 
 
 Impact on American Colonies Impact on Britain 
Currency Act Restricted the issue of paper money 
outside the New England colonies 
Mitigation of currency 
exchange risk for British 
merchants 
Sugar Act  Fighting the widespread smuggling of 
molasses. 
Reduction of molasses tax by 50% on 
all molasses imports.  
Strict enforcement of this trade law 
and establishing vice-Admiralty 
courts. 
First trade law not only to regulate 
trade but also to raise internal 
revenue. 
Amendment to the Molasses 
Act of 1733, which was clearly 
a trade regulation (external tax) 
 Raising revenue of expected 
25,000-45,000 pounds. 
 First colonial objection on 
constitutional grounds, 
complaining internal taxation. 
Townshend Duties Moderate duties to raise external 
duties to pay imperial officials. 
Institutional reform of the American 
customs services and new vice-
Admiralty courts. 
Raising revenue in colonial 
America to relief land tax in 
England. 
Imperial officials, especially 
customs officers, became less 
dependent to colonial 
assemblies being paid out of 
this revenue. 
 
This raises the question how to explain the sudden rupture of a “laissez faire” relation 
and the move to a coercive policy from 1763 onwards. The substitution of methods of 
the old colonial policy was a core element of the imperial crises. The sudden change of 
the mercantilist goals to Grenville´s measures provoked the known escalation: the 
colonists first protested, then resisted and finally open the rebellion against the mother 
country. 
It was the British attempt to change some basic features of the status quo to secure its 
imperial rule by tighter controls whilst the colonists simply asked to regain their 
traditional rights they enjoyed before Grenville´s innovations. 
The Currency Act was a significant change in the transatlantic economy as British 
officials tried to secure the investments of the mother country in the colonies. During 
wartime, most assemblies had authorized the – from the British perspective –
uncontrolled issue of paper money. The colonial grievance of the Currency Act was the 
interdiction to use paper money for tax payments as species was scarce in the colonies. 
The impact of the Currency Act can be rated as low, as the Parliament´s right to regulate 
currency matters was seen as legitimate and the exclusion of paper money for tax 
payments was repealed.  
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Unlike the Currency Act, the Sugar Act had much more far-reaching importance 
because of a very basic change in the trade laws in America: from a commercial 
strategy to fight the French to fiscal objectives, from neglecting the laws of trade to a 
reform of the customs establishment, leading to efficient supervision and collection of 
revenue. The Sugar Act – also called American Duties Act – can be best described as “a 
prelude to the Stamp Act”, because both can be clearly rated as internal taxation. The 
difference between these two acts was the perception of the American colonists: they 
accepted the Sugar Act while in form this act was presented as a replacement for the 
Molasses Act, which definitely was external taxation. The main objectives of the Sugar 
Act were threefold: to make customs enforcement more effective, to raise duties on 
commodities widely consumed in the American colonies and finally to cut the rate but 
to apply it on all imported molasses to maximize the revenues. In contrast to the 
Molasses Act of 1733, no regulation of trade was put in place. 
The articles of the Sugar Act were intended to end smuggling, to implement new 
structured customs procedures and collections, and to provide enforcement. Many 
colonists viewed the measure as oppressive, particularly in New England where 
smuggling was widespread. As already discussed in Chapter 4.3., the reduced tax on 
molasses was still higher than the “bribery rate”, but the New England colonies were 
mainly hit by the stricter enforcement of the Molasses Act. Table 13 shows a theoretical 
impact of nearly 24,000 pounds per year for the New England colonies, if smuggling 
would have been curbed completely. At any rate, the steep increase of the tax revenue – 
starting 1765 from 14,000 to 34,000 pounds in 1767 (Table 14) indicates the 
effectiveness of this act for the New England colonies. Given the total volume of 
imported molasses, the effect for the Middle and Southern colonies can be considered 
negligible. 
The American colonists acknowledged the right of Parliament to regulate trade, but the 
underlying trade regulation principles varied from import and export prohibition 
because of strategic considerations during the Seven Year´s War to raising revenue with 
no further background of trade regulation issues. Second, the American colonists 
accepted the right of Parliament to regulate trade, but at the same time they wanted 
enforcement left up to the colonies. 
After the fierce opposition of the American colonies against George Grenville´s Stamp 
Act and its repeal in 1766 –a closer analysis follows in the next chapter because of its 
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outstanding impact on the British-American relations – the Townshend period was 
driven by the wish to avoid any further controversy with the Americans, because of 
fear.
213
 The previous trade boycott of the American colonists for the repeal of the stamp 
Act had found a receptive target in Rockingham, who always kept an eye on the 
commercial interests of the British merchants. 
When the New York and New Jersey assemblies protested and refused to provision 
quarters according to the Quartering Act, the New York Restraining Act became law in 
June 1767. It stated that “the governor, Council and Assembly [of New York were] 
respectively restrained and prohibited from passing or assenting to any Act of Assembly 
for any other purpose whatsoever”, but it never was put into effect, when the American 
colonies renewed non-importation.
214
 
There was fear in Britain that the colonies would become united in their opposition to 
Britain and that this would strengthen their resistance and disobedience. In other words, 
there was a fear that all the colonial provinces would unite their opposition to 
Parliament´s supremacy over taxation. The trade boycott during the Stamp Act crisis 
and the threat to continue this strategy had demonstrated the economic power of the 
American colonies and the dependency of Britain in terms of exports – nearly four 
million pounds or 37 percent of the British export volume went to the American 
colonies. 
The outcome of this ambiguous British position was the Townshend Revenue Act and it 
shows a change in British attitudes toward the American colonies: They wanted to 
appease the colonies and indeed avoid any controversy with them. Tucker and 
Dickinson come to the following conclusion: “Within the space of a year, the principles 
on which the commercial legislation of Townshend had been based went from having 
no opponents to having no supporters.”215 
With the repeal of the Stamp Act and the reduction of the duty on molasses by the 
modified Sugar Act, the problem of sharing the financial burden of imperial defense 
remained unresolved. In March 1767, Townshend presented his plan to withdraw the 
army from the American interior to the seaboard and to cut the Indian superintendants 
as an economic measure and also to resolve the financial dependency of the British 
officials in the American colonies on the provincial assemblies. 
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In conclusion, one significant and inherent root-cause for an increasing resistance must 
be mentioned: the Sugar Act, which finally made the Americans sensitive as this bill 
went beyond any previous trade regulations within the status quo mercantilist policy. 
The rationale on the part of the American colonist was the fact that the molasses duties 
were cut by one half and thus this duty had lost its function to regulate and direct 
strategic trade relations. 
The Sugar Act and the related enforcement showed a decreasing willingness in the 
colonies to comply with “innovative” legislation, compared to the status quo before the 
reform projects of George Grenville. 
 
7.3. The Impact of the Stamp Act and its Repeal 
 
To analyze the impact of the Stamp Act it is necessary to spotlight the economic, 
political and legal complaints of the American colonists and, in addition, the counter-
position of the British government and officials which was based on two imperatives: 
first, the political solution of a repeal should not be seen as a compromise over 
Parliament´s supremacy, but second, to position the repeal, above all, as being in the 
British interest. 
To begin with the economic impact of the Stamp Act: in short, there would have been 
no impact. 
Not surprisingly, the American colonists emphasized the poverty of the colonies and the 
shortage of specie to raise the annual payments of approximately sixty thousand pounds 
– “if divided amongst 1,200,000 people, [the tax] would be only one shilling per head a 
year; which is but a third of the wages usually paid to every labourer or manufacturer 
there for one day´s labour [sic!]…”.216 As already discussed in chapter 4.4., Perkins 
calculated the cost to an average tax payer of 0.2 percent of per capita income or 5 
pence a year.
217
 The difference between 5 pence (Perkins) and one shilling/12 pence 
(Tucker) is readily explained: Perkins bases his calculation on the overall population 
while Tucker uses the working population as his basis. 
At any rate, the two indicators of the tax burden show a strong correlation in terms of 
percentage, based on the realistic assumption that two thirds of the productive 
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population out of the total population were working and receiving payments for 300 
days in a year. 
As demonstrated in this short quantitative overview, the colonial complaints about the 
Stamp Act were without foundation. 
The political impact was rather ambiguous as the Stamp Act Congress did not result in a 
strongly unified colonial position. There were also objections because only nine out of 
the thirteen colonies with twenty-seven delegates met at New York´s city hall.  
The following four colonies did not send delegates to the Stamp Act Congress: New 
Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. 
 
Map 3: Division within the 13 American colonies
218
. 
 
  
 
 
Map 3 shows a significant split between the Southern colonies and New England and 
the Middle colonies because of different “levels of grievances”. The reasons for this 
were as follows: 
1. A significant, asymmetric distribution of wealth (see Table 15)  
2. Widespread smuggling of molasses in the New England colonies 
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3. Organized protest movement and structured political discourse in the urban areas 
of New England and the Middle colonies 
4. The high volume of imports from Great Britain – 1.5 million pounds (see Table 
11.) – to the New England and Middle colonies.  
5. The balanced import/export volume of the Southern colonies would have been 
hit by British economic retaliation measures.    
The resulting declaration of the Stamp Act Congress was addressed to the House of 
Commons in order to make it clear that the House of Commons should not try to tax the 
colonies directly without the consent of the taxed.  In addition, the document made 
claim to the fundamental English rights such as trial by jury: in the Sugar Act, 
Parliament granted the vice-Admiralty court non-appellate jurisdiction over violations 
of the trade laws to curb the widespread smuggling. 
The Stamp Act Congress basically failed to send a clear message in this very moderate 
and loyal document, but in September 1765 anti-Stamp Act activists among the 
merchants decided to begin a non-importation boycott and demanded the repeal of the 
Stamp Act. 
The British government was left with three options as to how to react to the given 
political and economic deadlock: 
 
a. To meet the colonial objections through an amendment to the Stamp Act, 
respecting the grievances of specie shortage, the vice-Admiralty courts and 
the alleged stamp duties as a reason for an economic downturn. 
 
This option was the preference of King George III, but he finally accepted 
Rockingham´s position that the only political choice was between enforcement and 
repeal. An amendment would only appease the Stamp Act crisis in the short term, but 
would leave the underlying fundamental constitutional and political antagonism 
unresolved. 
 
b. To enforce the Stamp Act 
 
Was this option a realistic one?  
No; the first reason was the sudden change of the political actors. In 1765 “a 
government was in office composed mostly of men inclined to conciliate the 
colonies”.219 This is in sharp contrast to the position taken by Grenville and the Duke of 
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Cumberland. Both wanted to pursue a “get tough” policy when the first signs of 
resistance to the Stamp Act became apparent in October.  
P. D. G. Thomas
220
 and P. Langford
221
 describe the period between October 1765 and 
December 1765, based on the correspondence between the secretary of state for the 
Southern Department, Conway, and General Gage, who succeeded General Amherst in 
1763 as commander-in-chief of the British forces in America. Conway instructed Gage 
to employ force – after having exhausted all other measures – to suppress violence. On 
the other hand, Gage´s lack of widely dispersed troops was evident (see also Table 19.) 
and in New England, where the riots against the Stamp Act started, there were no troops 
at all. Conway was also aware of this military weakness. The Duke of Cumberland 
summoned a cabinet meeting on October 31 to discuss and to decide on the next steps – 
“presumably the dispatch of troops.”222  But the sudden death of the Duke of 
Cumberland on that decisive day, October 31, 1765 – the day before the Stamp Act was 
to take effect – finally stopped all further theoretical exercises to use military power to 
enforce the law in the American colonies.  
At any rate, this rationale weakened the position of the British officials in the American 
colonies who took a firm position against resistance and for the execution of law. 
 
c. The repeal of the Stamp Act and the reaffirmation of Parliament´s 
supremacy.  
 
Rockingham saw the import boycott of the American colonies as the most fundamental 
threat: a sharp decline in exports would cause a steep rise in domestic instability through 
unemployment and failing debt collection, followed by financial instability and social 
disorder. But he also understood “that Britain confronted not one crisis in America, but 
a set of interrelated problems that only conciliation could resolve.”223 
The first and most pressing set of interrelated issues was the Stamp Act itself. The 
colonists´ protests and social pressure on the British officials in the American colonies 
made the Stamp Act unenforceable and thus they effectively denied Parliament´s 
superiority over the colonies. 
The political dilemma of Rockingham was twofold: first, there was a political split 
between an existing consensus which supported enforcement on the one hand and the 
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policy of steady concession on the other. The second reason was the failure to deal with 
the imperial issues in a manner which did not ultimately lead to a true settlement of the 
numerous pending issues. Since 1763 governments acted under the pressure of 
circumstances as well as under the constraints of a political order that could not adapt to 
change. 
The repeal of the Stamp Act reduced these “pending issues” to one crucial problem: the 
assertion of sovereign authority over the colonies could only be put into practice if there 
was a political will to enforce this authority. 
Tucker and Hendrickson
224
 describe this dilemma in brief as a consequence of the fact 
“that the insistence upon exercising Parliament´s supremacy over the colonies was 
matched by the insistence upon avoiding the consequences”. The debate over the 
“political package”, in other words the repeal of the Stamp Act combined with the 
Declaratory Act, clearly showed the British fear of economic consequences in the short 
run but also the cost and also the consequences of a military confrontation with the 
American colonies. 
There was still a profound British concern that Bourbon troops could enter this struggle 
which could lead to the economic ruin of both parties.  
The psychological effect of repealing the Stamp Act should not be disregarded, either:  
it gave the American colonists a new and a strong confidence in their economic power 
and importance within the imperial economy, but it also created a sort of “zero 
tolerance” attitude on the part of the British in the ongoing confrontations.  
A crisis had been appeased and the positions, as they had existed in 1763, had been 
restored but a comprehensive imperial policy still did not exist. Frank O’Gorman225 
interprets the strategies as an attempt to “improve and streamline the old mercantilist 
structure of an Empire”. The major questions remained unresolved: the need for a far-
sighted political framework for colonial emancipation and the need to make progress on 
the issue of economic and fair payment of compensation. The exclusive focus on  
parliamentary supremacy resulted in parliamentary intervention in internal and external 
American affairs. When the elite among the American colonists started to challenge that 
authority, the King and Parliament strongly defended the status quo of overall 
supremacy, ignoring the existing mature structure of political institutions in the 
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American colonies and, in so doing, making a sustainable settlement of the political, 
constitutional and economic issues absolutely impossible. 
At any rate, the Americans took the initiative in the process of colonial emancipation 
and the following decades showed the results of it. 
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Abstract 
 
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Ursachen, Differenzen und Wechselwirkungen in den 
wirtschaftlichen, politischen und konstitutionellen Beziehungen zwischen Gross-
britannien und seinen nordamerikanischen Kolonien in der Zeit von 1763 bis 1767.    
Das Forschungsinteresse ist eine analytische Verdichtung und Begründung der 
eskalierenden Spannungsverhältnisse zwischen einem auf dem status quo beharrenden 
Mutterland und seinen sich rasch emanzipirenden Kolonien in Nordamerika.  
Nach dem Ende des Siebenjährigen Krieges und mit dem Frieden von Paris 1763  hatte 
Grossbritannien unter der Regentschaft von George III. die politische und ökonomische 
Kontrolle über einen stark erweiteten und heterogenen Kolonialbesitz in Nordamerika 
wieder zu gewinnen und neu zu ordnen. Grundvoraussetzung dafür war die konsequente 
Durchsetzung von britischem Recht in Hinblick auf die Steuereinhebung, da der Krieg 
und die militärische Sicherung des Kolonialbesitzes ein enormes Defizit von 132 
Millionen Pfund – bei einem durchschnittlichen Jahresbudget von 8 Millionen Pfund – 
akkumuliert hatte. 
Mitte 1764 begann Kanzler Grenville sein ehrgeiziges Reformprogramm mit dem Sugar 
Act, der auf dem Molasses Act aus 1733 basierte und importierte Molasse und Zucker 
besteuerte. Die Strategie von Grenville war es, den Steuersatz zu halbieren aber 
gleichzeitig die Einhebung dieser Abgabe durch verstärkten Einsatz von Marine und 
Seegerichten (Admiralty Courts) konsequent durchzusetzen. Dieser erste Reformschritt 
Grenville war von aufkommender Kritik aus den Kolonien begleitet, denn der Sugar Act 
diente nicht der akzeptierten Wirtschaftslenkung im Rahmen der Navigation Acts 
sondern war eine Steuer zur Finanzierung der britischen Garnisonen in den 
amerikanischen Kolonien. Die mit Offizieren besetzten Seegerichte ohne 
Berufungsmöglichkeit zur Rechtdurchsetzung  verstiessen gleichzeitig gegen das 
konstitutionelle Rechtsverständnis der Kolonisten. 
Die Spannungen zwischen dem Zentralparlament und den kolonialen politischen Eliten 
eskalierten mit der Verabschiedung des Stamp Acts gleich auf mehreren Diskurs-
Ebenen.  
Die politisch-konstitutionelle Auseinandersetzung betraf die Grundsatzfrage, ob das 
Parlament ohne politischer Repräsentation der Kolonisten das Recht hat, neue Steuern 
für sie zu beschliessen, welches in der kolonialen Kurzformel „no taxation without 
representation“ ihren Niederschlag fand.  
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Die zweite Ebene war die ökonomische: die stark steigende Bedeutung britischer 
Exporte in die amerikanischen Kolonien und der monopolistische Nutzen der 
Navigation Acts für den britischen Handel machte ein koloniales Handelsboykott zu 
einer wirksamen Waffe gegenüber den steigenden Handelshemmnissen und monetären 
Eingriffen (Currency Act) des Mutterlandes. Der resultierende Druck britischer 
Kaufleute führte zur Zurücknahme dieses Gesetzes bei gleichzeitiger formaler 
Festschreibung, dass das Parlament weiterhin die exklusive, uneingeschränkte („in all 
cases whatsoever“) legistische Macht über alle Teile Britanniens ausübt.  
Die dritte Ebene ist jene der politischen Institute und behandelt das ungeregelte 
Spannungsfeld lokaler, representativer Assemblies und dem Zentralparlament. Durch 
die geografische Distanz und unterschiedliche kostitutionelle Interpretationen bedingt, 
entwickelten sich zwei realpolitisch legitimierte, konkurrierende wie auch divergierende 
Parallelwelten.  
Die zentralen Ursachen einer Entwicklung, die ab 1775 zum amerikanischen 
Unabhängigkeitskrieg führten, werden ausführlich beschrieben und analytisch 
zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt.   
  
 
